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In electronics, a short circuit is “[a] low-resistance connection between 
two points in an electrical circuit, causing the current to bypass the rest of 
the circuit.”1  Clever defendants in some states have found a way to achieve 
a similar effect in the civil justice system, bypassing litigation of their cases 
on the merits.2  By obtaining a judgment against a plaintiff then executing on 
and purchasing the plaintiff’s claim, a defendant can “short circuit” the 
justice system and extinguish a lawsuit against itself, regardless of the 
merits.3 
To illustrate the problem, suppose a plaintiff is injured when he is 
negligently struck by a delivery truck driver.  Plaintiff sues both the driver 
and the driver’s employer, alleging damages of $500,000, and has evidence 
of the driver’s negligence that makes success on the merits extremely likely.  
However, plaintiff is a judgment debtor—he owes $50,000 to a third party 
from an unsatisfied judgment in a prior action.  Defendants purchase the 
prior judgment from the third party for a small sum, buying the right to 
enforce that judgment against plaintiff and becoming the plaintiff’s 
judgment creditors.4  To enforce the judgment they have just purchased, 
defendants obtain a writ of execution against plaintiff’s claims in the 
pending negligence lawsuit against defendants.  Plaintiff’s claims—a form 
of property called a “chose in action”—are seized and sold at a sheriff’s 
auction.  Defendants are the only bidders at the sale and purchase plaintiff’s 
claims for $10,000.  Defendants now own plaintiff’s right to pursue—or not 
pursue—the lawsuit.5  They are, in effect, both plaintiffs and defendants, 
while the original plaintiff has been stripped of standing.6  In their new 
capacity as plaintiffs, defendants move to dismiss the claims against 
themselves.  Thus, defendants have extinguished the plaintiff’s $500,000 
claim for the comparatively small sum of $10,000, without trying the case 
on the merits or negotiating a voluntary settlement.  They have “bypass[ed] 
the rest of the circuit,” and plaintiff is forever barred from recovery on those 
claims.7 
 
 1.  AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1283 (4th ed. 2002). 
 2.  RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(Lucero, J., concurring). 
 3.  See, e.g., id. at 1071. 
 4.  Defendants can obtain a judgment against the plaintiff in many ways.  See Citizens Nat’l 
Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Miss. 2006) (judgment on a 
counterclaim); RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1071 (judgment for attorney’s fees); Applied Med. 
Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 702–03 (Utah 2002) (judgment in a parallel proceeding); Paglia 
v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (puchase of a judgment from a third party). 
 5.  RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1075. 
 6.  See id. (noting that by obtaining plaintiff’s cause of action, defendant deprived plaintiff of 
standing). 
 7.  See supra note 1. 
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Cases of this nature are rare—there are about twenty-five cases in 
thirteen jurisdictions across the country—but the case law is relatively well 
developed in Washington and Utah.8  Washington empowers courts to refuse 
to issue a writ of execution to prevent a judgment creditor from obtaining 
control of both sides of a lawsuit9 if the “demands of justice to all parties can 
be reasonably satisfied.”10  In contrast, Utah has adopted a bright-line rule 
that allows judgment creditors to execute on choses in action against 
themselves, but has carved out a limited public policy exception prohibiting 
lawyers from obtaining malpractice claims against themselves.11  This 
Comment argues that Washington’s approach of allowing a trial court to 
exercise its discretion to refuse to issue a writ of execution is preferable to 
Utah’s bright-line rule.  Washington’s approach is preferable because it 
allows a court to balance the interests of the parties and society to ensure a 
just result.  In contrast, Utah’s approach ignores the legitimate interests of 
the judgment debtor and allows defendants to use a writ of execution, a mere 
procedural tool, as shield against liability—a purpose for which the writ of 
execution are not intended.  After establishing the superiority of 
Washington’s approach, this Comment argues that it could be improved by 
adopting a four-factor balancing test to determine whether or not the writ 
should issue. 
This Comment’s approach can be summarized as follows.  Part II 
discusses the basic structure of the law surrounding execution and choses in 
action.  Specifically, it outlines the nature of choses in action as property,12 
the law of execution,13 execution on choses in action,14 and constitutional 
rights associated with choses in action.15  Part III describes cases in which a 
defendant judgment creditor has attempted to execute on choses in action 
against itself, focusing primarily on Washington and Utah’s approaches, but 
describing cases from other jurisdictions where appropriate.  Part IV begins 
by establishing the superiority of a balancing test compared to the benefits of 
a bright-line rule that either allows or prohibits the tactic.16  It then identifies 
 
 8.  See infra notes 129–33 and accompanying text. 
 9.  MP Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931, 935–36 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 10.  Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 11.  Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 702–04 (Utah 2002). 
 12.  See infra Part II.A. 
 13.  See infra Part II.B. 
 14.  See infra Part II.C. 
 15.  See infra Part II.D. 
 16.  See infra Part IV.A. 
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and analyzes the interests of the judgment debtor,17 the judgment creditor,18 
and society,19 with an eye toward illuminating how different courts have 
analyzed and valued those interests.  Then it proposes a four-factor test that 
will properly balance the interests of all of the parties and ensure that courts 
may exercise their discretion to achieve a just result.20  Part V.A returns to 
the hypothetical scenario described above to illustrate some of the potential 
negative consequences of Utah’s unrestrained approach and how 
Washington’s approach, coupled with this Comment’s proposed four-factor 
test, can empower a court to issue a ruling that justly accommodates the 
interests of all of the parties involved.  Finally, Part V.B briefly discusses 
potential barriers to implementation of the proposed solution. 
II.   CHOSES IN ACTION AND THE LAW OF EXECUTION 
A plaintiff’s claim is a form of personal property called a “chose in 
action” and was considered inalienable until the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.21  A writ of execution is a court’s written order to its 
officer to seize and sell property belonging to a judgment debtor, and then 
give the proceeds to the judgment creditor to satisfy the judgment.22  
Because choses in action were long considered inalienable, they were not 
subject to execution at common law.23  Over time, as the common law’s 
restriction on the alienation of choses in action eroded, most states passed 
statutes permitting a judgment creditor to reach choses in action to satisfy a 
judgment.24  This opened the door to defendants who wished to execute on 
choses in action against themselves to avoid defending against a plaintiff’s 
claim on the merits.25  However, there are also some constitutional 
protections associated with choses in action, such as the right to a jury trial 
and the right of access to a state’s courts, that may act as a barrier to 
defendants hoping to execute on choses in action against themselves.26 
 
 17.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 18.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 19.  See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 20.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 21.  Isaac Marcushamer, Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims and Liability, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1543, 1550–51 (2005). 
 22.  See Equity Portfolio, LLC, Ltd. v. Schriever, 799 A.2d 1236, 1237 (Me. 2002) (“Equity 
sought judicial enforcement of the money judgment via a writ of execution, which permits the 
county sheriff to seize and sell the debtor’s property.”). 
 23.  Woody’s Olympia Lumber, Inc. v. Roney, 513 P.2d 849, 850 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). 
 24.  See, e.g., UTAH R. CIV. P. 69(f) (repealed 2004). 
 25.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Dahlquist, 225 P. 817, 818 (Wash. 1924). 
 26.  See, e.g., Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. App. 1992). 
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A. A Plaintiff’s Claim Is a “Chose in Action” 
A plaintiff’s cause of action generally falls under a specific category of 
property called a chose in action.27  Black’s Law Dictionary defines a chose 
in action as: 
(1)  A proprietary right in personam, such as debt owed by another 
person, a share in a joint-stock company, or a claim for 
damages in tort. 
(2)  The right to bring an action to recover a debt, money, or thing. 
(3)  Personal property that one person owns but another person 
possesses, the owner being able to regain possession through a 
lawsuit.28 
A plaintiff’s claim for relief is encompassed by the second definition: “[t]he 
right to bring an action to recover a debt, money, or thing.”29 
Choses in action could not be sold at common law.30  This rule was 
based on the notion that choses in action arise from personal relationships 
between parties and that one cannot alienate a personal relationship.31  
Another underlying rationale was the notion that allowing the transfer of 
claims would lead to increased litigation by encouraging champerty and 
 
 27.  Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U.S. 589, 595–96 (1915) (“[A] ‘chose in action embraces in one 
sense all rights of action.’” (quoting Dundas v. Bowler, 8 F. Cas. 28, 29 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843))); 
Garrett v. Gay, 394 So. 2d 321, 322 (Miss. 1981) (“A ‘chose in action’ means, literally, a thing in 
action, and is the right of bringing an action, . . . or a right of proceeding in a court of law to procure 
the payment of a sum of money, or . . . a right to recover money or personal property by a judicial 
proceeding.” (quoting 73 C.J.S. Property § 9 (1951))). 
 28.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (9th ed. 2009).  The term “chose in action” can thus refer to 
the right to bring suit to recover some item of property or the item of property itself.  For the 
purposes of this Comment, the term “chose in action” will refer only to a party’s right to bring suit, 
encompassed in the first and second of the three definitions. 
 29.  Id.  This Comment is unconcerned with execution on choses in action fitting the first and 
third definitions but not the second.  However, there is some overlap between the various definitions.  
For example, if one executes upon and purchases a debt, then one purchases the right to bring an 
action to collect that debt.  See Johnson, 225 P. at 818. 
 30.  J.B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 337, 337 (1890) (“In a word, no right 
of action, whether a right in rem or a right in personam, whether arising ex contractu or ex delicto, 
was assignable either by act of the party or by operation of law.”).  However, this rule was subject to 
some limited exceptions.  Id. at 338.  For example, the sovereign could assign a chose in action, or a 
party could grant an interest to “A. and his assigns” in an annuity, land, or warranty, and the assignee 
would be able to bring suit against the grantor of the interest.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 339. 
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maintenance.32  Over time this rule eroded, and by the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, it had disappeared almost entirely.33  Today, choses in 
action are widely recognized as alienable forms of personal property.34 
B.  The Law of Execution 
As it is well known, the end result of litigation on the merits of a case is 
a final judgment—one that determines the rights and interests of the parties 
to the litigation and either grants or denies the relief sought.35  When a 
judgment for money damages is entered, the court may not need to take 
further action if the indebted party simply pays, or “satisfies,” the 
 
 32.  Marcushamer, supra note 21, at 1550–51.  Blackstone defines champerty as “a species of 
maintenance . . . : being a bargain with a [party to litigation] to divide the [subject of the suit], if they 
prevail at law; whereupon the champerter is to carry on the party’s suit as his own expense.”  4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35.  Maintenance is defined as the “officious 
intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with 
money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.”  Id. at *134.  Medieval jurists feared that such 
behavior would lead to an increase in litigation.  Marcushamer, supra note 21, at 1551 (“Medieval 
society viewed legal proceedings as a dangerous procedure; this is not surprising considering a legal 
system that permitted trial by battle.  The inherent physical danger of trial, coupled with the 
Christian sentiment of forgiveness and turning the other cheek, led people to believe that litigation 
was an indication of an un-Christian spirit.” (internal footnotes omitted)).  The tactic discussed in 
this Comment does not raise any of the traditional concerns that prohibited the assignment of a chose 
in action because allowing a judgment creditor to execute on and extinguish claims against itself 
does not encourage litigation, but ends it. 
 33.  See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816, 
826–29 (1916). 
 34.  See Marcushamer, supra note 21, at 1553–65 (identifying four approaches to assignment of 
claims in the American legal system today, including: (1) no enforcement or recognition of 
maintenance and champerty, leading to full alienability of all choses in action; (2) prohibiting only 
lawyers from engaging in champerty, leading to narrow limitations on the assignability of choses in 
action; (3) allowing assignment of some choses in action and prohibiting assignment of others due to 
concerns of champerty, based on (a) whether the claim survives, or (b) the intent of the person 
providing financial support for the litigation; and (4) enforcement of prohibitions on champerty, 
maintenance, and assignment).  Only two states still prohibit champerty and maintenance: Georgia 
and Illinois.  Id. at 1563–64.  Georgia considers contracts for the sale of causes of action to violate 
public policy, and Illinois prohibits maintenance, but only if done with a view to promote litigation.  
Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(a)(5) (West 2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/32-12 (West 
2004)). 
  The right to sell a chose in action strongly suggests that choses in action are property 
interests; however, the mere fact that one can sell one’s chose in action does not categorically mean 
that choses in action may be reached through levy and execution.  See Woody’s Olympia Lumber, 
Inc. v. Roney, 513 P.2d 849, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that “[a]ssignability affects the 
value of a property right, but its absence does not extinguish it” when faced with the debtor’s 
argument that his unliquidated tort claim for pain and suffering was not subject to execution because 
it was not assignable).  But see Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578, 580–81 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) 
(“Thus, if a debtor’s cause of action is not assignable, a court cannot coerce the debtor, by means of 
a creditor’s bill, to assign the cause of action to his creditor.”) (applying Missouri’s execution 
statute). 
 35.  Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
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judgment.36  However, if the judgment debtor does not satisfy the judgment, 
the judgment creditor has an array of procedural tools that can be used to 
enforce the judgment.37  One of these tools is a writ of execution.38 
A writ of execution is an expression of the court’s inherent power to 
enforce its judgments.39  At its most basic level, a writ of execution is simply 
the court’s written command to its officer to seize (or “levy”)40 and sell the 
judgment debtor’s property and then give the proceeds to the judgment 
creditor.41  One court explained: 
The purpose of execution of a judgment is not merely to take 
property out of the hands of the losing party, but rather is also to 
transfer that property to the hands of the prevailing party—where, 
 
 36.  See RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that “[p]laintiff could have paid the judgment” to avoid execution); Salveter v. Salveter, 53 
P.2d 381, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (“Payment of a judgment satisfies it and extinguishes it.”); 
Rondack Const. Servs., Inc. v. Kaatsbaan Int’l Dance Ctr., Inc., 864 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008) (“When the judgment debtor tenders the amount necessary to satisfy the judgment, the 
execution lien is discharged.”), aff’d, 923 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 2009).  This Comment is concerned 
only with enforcement of judgments for money damages, and not enforcement of judgments that 
order specific performance or other equitable remedies. 
 37.  In addition to execution, other examples of these tools include garnishment and turnover.  
Garnishment is a court order served on one who owes money to a judgment debtor that orders the 
person served to pay the sheriff rather than the judgment debtor.  MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., 
BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 9 (2d ed. 1996).  In California, garnishment is the 
proper means of reaching unliquidated tort claims.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 487.010 (West 2009).  
Similarly, California law allows a judgment creditor to obtain a lien on a judgment debtor’s pending 
choses in action.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.410(a) (West 2009).  Turnover orders can be 
obtained when the judgment debtor owns property that cannot be reached by ordinary legal process.  
Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 761–62 (Tex. App. 1992).  In Texas, “the 
court has discretion . . . to determine how to use the property to satisfy the judgment” under a 
turnover order.  Id.  It may order the property sold through execution, placed in the hands of a 
receiver to be sold, or to “otherwise apply the property to the satisfaction of the judgment.”  Id. 
 38.  FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1) (“A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the 
court directs otherwise.”).  “Execution is the process of the court by which it provides for the 
enforcement of a final judgment it has rendered in an action after it has determined the issues and 
adjudged a recovery.”  Mehdipour v. Holland, 177 P.3d 544, 550 (Okla. 2007).  It has been 
described as “a bitter, last resort, favorable to no one (save, perhaps, the sheriff[, who collects 
fees]).”  ROGER A. NEEDHAM & LESTER POLLACK, COLLECTING CLAIMS AND ENFORCING 
JUDGMENTS § 12.2 (1969). 
 39.  RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1074; 30 C.J.S. Executions § 1 (2009). 
 40.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 991 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “levy” as “to take or seize property 
in execution of a judgment”). 
 41.  See Kelley v. Vincent, 8 Ohio St. 415, 420–21 (1858) (discussing the precise nature of a writ 
of execution in detail). 
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by virtue of the judgment itself, it has been decided through due 
process and course of law that the property belongs.42 
As the above language suggests, the process of executing on a judgment 
debtor’s property strongly favors the judgment creditor, who has already 
litigated the case on the merits and prevailed.43 
However, the judgment debtor is not entirely forsaken by the law, as the 
process of levy and execution has some built-in safeguards meant to protect 
the judgment debtor’s interests and prevent a windfall for the judgment 
creditor that might result from the outright transfer of assets from the 
judgment debtor to the judgment creditor.44  First, “[t]he public auction 
procedure provides a key safeguard” for a judgment debtor because the 
public nature of the sale provides an opportunity for the open market to 
determine the value of the judgment debtor’s property.45  Second, state 
execution statutes also require public notice for a certain period of time so 
that potentially interested bidders, including the judgment debtor, will have 
the opportunity to attend and bid at the sale.46  Third, if an execution sale 
results in proceeds in excess of the value of the judgment, the surplus will be 
returned to the judgment debtor.47  However, if the property sells for less 
than the value of the judgment, the judgment creditor will be entitled to a 
deficiency judgment; thus, the judgment debtor will still be liable for the 
remainder of the judgment.48  These procedural safeguards recognize that a 
writ of execution is a powerful tool, but one which is meant only to aid in 
the collection of the judgment.49  A writ of execution should not go so far as 
 
 42.  McVeigh v. Lerner, 849 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. App. 1993).  Of course, a writ of execution 
does not transfer the property directly; rather, the judgment creditor is only entitled to the proceeds 
from the sale of the property up to the amount of the judgment.  Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. 
Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1999). 
 43.  See Cnty. Trust Co. v. Berg, 318 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (“The policy of the law 
is to assist rather than to make it more difficult for the judgment creditor.”). 
 44.  See Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762, 767–68 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(providing an outstanding discussion of the protections offered by the process of levy and execution 
of a judgment debtor’s property). 
 45.  Id. at 767; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 
1011 (Miss. 2006) (noting that property sold at an execution sale will go to the highest bidder).  
However, there is some doubt as to whether unliquidated claims actually fetch a fair value when sold 
at a public auction.  See infra notes 259–73 and accompanying text. 
 46.  See Citizens Nat’l, 935 So. 2d at 1011, 1012 (describing how Mississippi law “requires at 
least ten days of pre-sale advertising”); see also Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 767 (“A 
public sale also provides a judgment debtor an opportunity to bid on their own [property], or 
convince a third party to bid an amount higher than the value of the judgment.”). 
 47.  NEEDHAM & POLLACK, supra note 38, § 12.7. 
 48.  Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1999). 
 49.  Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
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to “outrage the right of a judgment debtor,”50 and excessive levy is not 
allowed.51 
The procedure for execution of a judgment is governed almost 
exclusively by state law.52  Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even 
judgments entered by federal courts on claims arising under federal law are 
enforced according to the law of execution of the state in which the district 
court is located in the absence of a federal statute to the contrary.53  
Consequently, “[t]he law governing execution of judgments is highly 
complex and in this country is subject [to] a good deal of technical variation 
from one state to another.”54  Thus, the procedure for execution is, in the 
vast majority of cases, governed by state statutes and surrounding case law.55 
Most states follow a similar procedure.56  Once a final judgment for 
money damages is entered, the judgment creditor is entitled to a writ of 
execution.57  Through supplemental proceedings, the judgment creditor may 
conduct discovery into the judgment debtor’s assets to assess what property 
can be levied and sold under the writ.58  Which specific items of the 
 
 50.  Id. (citing Triplett v. Begman, 114 P. 899, 900 (Wash. 1914)). 
 51.  Capozzi v. Antonoplos, 201 A.2d 420, 422 (Pa. 1964). 
 52.  Doreen J. Gridley, Note, The Immunity of Intangible Assets from a Writ of Execution: Must 
We Forgive Our Debtors?, 28 IND. L. REV. 755, 764 (1995). 
 53.  FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1) (“A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the 
court directs otherwise.  The procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and in 
aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is 
located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.”).  One obvious context in which 
federal execution statutes may preempt state execution rules is bankruptcy proceedings.  11 U.S.C. § 
541 (2006) (defining property subject to execution and including choses in action in that definition). 
 54.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS intro. note c (1980). 
 55.  RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2009); see, 
e.g., McBurney v. Shaw, 804 A.2d 467, 470 (N.H. 2002) (“Executions and levy of executions are 
governed by statute . . . .”); Abercia v. Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd., 217 S.W.3d 688, 694 (Tex. 
App. 2007) (“Execution is governed by rule and statute.”). 
 56.  See NEEDHAM & POLLACK, supra note 38, § 12.1. 
 57.  Katz v. N.M.E. Hosps., Inc., 842 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“Absent a 
supersedeas bond or order staying further proceedings in relation to the judgment, judgment 
creditors are entitled to pursue execution and collection of the judgment.”).  See infra notes 71–86 
and accompanying text (discussing stays and supersedeas bonds).  In several northeastern states, a 
writ of execution may not issue until the expiration of the appeal period or the resolution of any 
appeal taken from the judgment.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 16 (2010) (“No execution 
shall issue upon a judgment until the exhaustion of all possible appellate review thereof . . . .”); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 4651 (2010) (writ may not issue until expiration of period for appeal or until 
dismissal by the appellate court); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527:1 (2010) (“No execution shall issue 
until the expiration of the appeal period.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-8 (West 2010) (writs may not 
issue until the resolution of a pending appeal). 
 58.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2) (directing federal district courts to apply state law execution 
proceedings); see generally NEEDHAM & POLLACK, supra note 38, ch. 13. 
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judgment debtor’s property are available for execution is governed by 
statute.59  These statutes can be extremely broad, authorizing execution on 
all of the judgment debtor’s property, then carving out specific, narrow 
exceptions.60  Other states affirmatively name specific types of property 
belonging to a judgment debtor that are subject to execution.61  The 
judgment creditor exercises a large degree of control over the selection of 
the property to be sold under the writ of execution, unless state law provides 
otherwise.62  However, a court does retain a measure of control over the 
enforcement of its own judgments.63 
By the time the litigants have reached the stage in the litigation where a 
court may issue a writ of execution, the judgment creditor has prevailed on 
the merits and petitioned the court for the levy and execution on specific 
property of the judgment debtor.64  If the judgment debtor wishes to 
challenge the writ, he must do so before the writ issues and the sheriff’s sale 
takes place, as a writ of execution generally may not be challenged 
collaterally.65  One possible way to challenge a writ of execution is to move 
to quash the writ.66  A motion to quash attacks the validity of the writ of 
execution.67  Possible grounds for a motion to quash a writ of execution are 
that a judgment is void, that the judgment debtor is not the sole owner of the 
property, or that the property sought to be levied upon is not subject to 
execution.68  The judgment debtor, in filing a motion to quash the writ, may 
 
 59.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1075 (examining Utah statutes and case law to determine 
property subject to execution). 
 60.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 18.345 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.090 (2011). 
 61.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 487.010 (West 2009).  California further varies its 
execution statute by differentiating between property subject to execution based on what type of 
entity the debtor is, such as a corporation as opposed to a natural person.  Id. 
 62.  See, e.g., Smith v. Hanson, 293 N.W. 551, 556 (N.D. 1940) (“The authorities are generally 
agreed that, in absence of statute providing to the contrary, a judgment creditor at whose instance an 
execution is issued is entitled to exercise a considerable degree of control, and to give directions to 
the officer as to the time and manner of executing the writ, and the particular property to be 
subjected to levy and sale.”). 
 63.  See, e.g., MP Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); see also 
Capozzi v. Antonoplos, 201 A.2d 420, 422 (Pa. 1964) (“The court below certainly had the power of 
control over its own execution process and to act to prevent an abuse thereof.”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Dahlquist, 225 P. 817, 817 (Wash. 1929). 
 65.  See RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1071 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding sale of defendant’s property in part because defendant failed to challenge the writ of 
execution when it was issued).  There are exceptions to this rule, however.  See Paglia v. Breskovich, 
522 P.2d 511, 514 (vacating a writ of execution on a judgment debtor’s choses in action after the 
sale was complete). 
 66.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1072 (“Plaintiff filed a motion to stay or quash the execution 
sale.”). 
 67.  Interstate Life Ins. Co. v. Arrington, 307 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. App. 1957) (“[T]he general 
rule [is] that a proceeding to set aside an execution is a direct attack on the process and that 
challenging validity of the execution in any other proceeding is a collateral attack.”). 
 68.  See 33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 287–327 (2005). 
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not challenge the underlying judgment on the merits and must attack only 
the writ of execution itself.69  The trial court’s ruling is subject to the 
appellate process.70 
Another common way for judgment debtors to prevent a writ of 
execution from being carried out is by obtaining a stay.71  “A stay of 
execution is the stopping or arresting of execution on a judgment, or of the 
creditor’s right to issue execution, for a limited period.”72  Some states hold 
that a stay may be granted at the discretion of the court by virtue of its own 
inherent authority over its judgments, although statutory procedures for 
obtaining a stay may also exist.73  Others hold that because execution is a 
statutory proceeding, the only way to obtain a stay of execution is by 
meeting the statutory requirements.74  Many states, either through statutes or 
rules of court, require the judgment debtor to post some form of security in 
order to obtain a stay.75 
One common context in which stays are granted is pending the 
resolution of an appeal taken from the judgment to be enforced.76  Generally, 
“the mere pendency of an appeal does not operate to stay execution 
proceedings.”77  In most states, a judgment debtor must post a supersedeas 
bond, usually consisting of a sum of money or property sufficient to ensure 
 
 69.  Wycoff v. Wycoff, 374 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (“[E]rrors of law do not 
constitute good cause for granting a stay of execution. . . .”); Smith v. Smith, 797 S.W.2d 798, 800 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (“A motion to quash an execution cannot be substituted for an appeal . . . .”). 
 70.  See MP Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931, 934 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 71.  See, e.g., Brenton Bros. v. Dorr, 239 N.W. 808, 810 (Iowa 1931) (holding that a trial court 
may grant a stay of execution for a reasonable time to “escape the inequitable use of the writ”). 
 72.  33 C.J.S. Executions § 247 (2009). 
 73.  See, e.g., City of Easton v. Marra, 862 A.2d 170, 174 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (“It is an 
equally accepted principle that a court in which an execution proceeding is pending has the inherent 
power to stay the proceeding upon legal or equitable grounds, when it is necessary to protect the 
rights of a party.”); see also 33 C.J.S. Executions § 248 (2009).  The federal court system also 
adheres to this rule, allowing some flexibility in the amount of supersedeas or acceptable property.  
Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 760–61 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“In 
unusual circumstances . . . the district court in its discretion may order partially secured or unsecured 
stays if they do not unduly endanger the judgment creditor’s interest in ultimate recovery.”); 
Athridge v. Iglesias, 464 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2006) (memorandum opinion) (holding that 
defendants may post real estate holdings as security in lieu of a full supersedeas bond). 
 74.  See, e.g., Looney v. Raby, 268 S.W.3d 345, 350 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (“Section 16-66-
301(a) and its accompanying statutes contain the exclusive means of staying or vacating writs of 
execution, and all other means are excluded.”); see also 33 C.J.S. Executions § 248 (2009). 
 75.  33 C.J.S. Executions § 261 (2009). 
 76.  See, e.g., Athridge, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 24, 25. 
 77.  33 C.J.S. Executions § 253 (2009); see also FM. Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 
656 F. Supp. 2d 795, 799 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (applying Illinois law). 
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payment of the judgment,78 in order to obtain a stay while an appeal is 
pending.79  A supersedeas bond is meant “to preserve the status quo while 
protecting the non-appealing party’s rights pending appeal.”80  Once the 
supersedeas bond is posted, a stay order issues, which essentially orders the 
trial court to stop all proceedings for enforcement of the judgment pending 
the outcome of the appeal.81  In some jurisdictions, including the federal 
system, courts have the authority to vary the amount of supersedeas required 
or to accept other property in lieu of cash as security in extraordinary 
circumstances.82 
A party technically does not need to post a supersedeas bond to pursue 
an appeal because “[a] judgment debtor who is unable or is unwilling to post 
a supersedeas bond retains the right to appeal even if the judgment is 
executed.”83  Similarly, whether a judgment debtor posts a supersedeas bond 
to stay execution of a judgment pending appeal ordinarily has no bearing on 
the outcome of the appeal.84  However, while “[n]o security or undertaking 
for costs is necessary to perfect an appeal[,] . . . the appeal [itself] does not 
stay the enforcement of the judgment.  Accordingly, failure to obtain a stay 
of execution may result in an execution being levied.”85  If the judgment 
debtor’s property is levied and sold at execution and the judgment debtor 
obtains a reversal of the underlying judgment on appeal, he may be entitled 
 
 78.  5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 402 (2007). 
 79.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d) (“If an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay by 
supersedeas bond, except in an action described in Rule 62(a)(1) or (2).  The bond may be given 
upon or after filing the notice of appeal or after obtaining the order allowing the appeal.  The stay 
takes effect when the court approves the bond.”).  However, in federal courts, a judgment debtor 
must also show that granting a stay would be proper based on a balancing test extremely similar to 
that for a preliminary injunction, based on “(1) a reasonable probability of success on appeal, (2) the 
prospect of irreparable injury . . . if relief is not granted; (3) the possibility of harm to other 
interested persons and (4) the public interest.”  Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 651 F.2d 177, 177 (3d Cir. 
1981); see also Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 
1958). 
 80.  Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Boyd, 781 F.2d 1494, 1498 (11th Cir. 1986); see also In re 
Koome, 514 P.2d 520, 522–23 (Wash. 1973) (“A stay order finds its genesis in the writ of 
supersedeas, originally an auxiliary process designed to supersede enforcement of a judgment or 
order brought up for review, thereby maintaining the status quo and preserving the fruits of the 
appeal should it prove successful.”). 
 81.  5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 398 (2007). 
 82.  Fed. Prescription Serv. Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
Athridge v. Iglesias, 464 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 83.  Strong v. Laubach, 443 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 84.  See NEEDHAM & POLLACK, supra note 38, § 11.8.  However, when a judgment creditor 
obtains a writ of execution on the underlying chose in action, purchases it at the execution sale, and 
dismisses the appeal, the appeal never reaches a determination on the merits.  See RMA Ventures 
Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2009).  Thus, when a judgment 
creditor obtains the judgment debtor’s appeal and underlying cause of action against the judgment 
creditor through a writ of execution, the consequences are unique. 
 85.  NEEDHAM & POLLACK, supra note 38, § 11.8. 
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to restitution for the sale or, if it is within the power of the court, the return 
of his property.86 
In sum, execution is one of the primary methods through which a 
judgment creditor may enforce his judgment against the judgment debtor.87  
Generally, the policy of the court is to assist the judgment creditor in 
satisfying the judgment.88  However, there are some protections for a 
judgment debtor built into the execution process, and execution is not meant 
to infringe on the judgment debtor’s rights beyond the extent necessary to 
satisfy the judgment.89  Moreover, the judgment debtor can contest the writ 
of execution directly by filing a motion to quash or by obtaining a stay of 
execution.90  It is within this framework that one must analyze whether a 
judgment creditor should be permitted to use a writ of execution to obtain 
and dismiss choses in action against itself. 
C.  Choses in Action as Property Subject to Execution 
As noted above, there is a great deal of variation among the states as to 
which types of property are subject to execution.91  While most states allow 
writs of execution to issue for personal property or real property, states vary 
considerably on which forms of intangible property are subject to a writ of 
execution.92  Choses in action, as a form of intangible property, are no 
exception.93 
 
 86.  Strong, 443 F.3d at 1299 (“Should the judgment be reversed on appeal, a district court may, 
on motion or sua sponte, order the judgment creditor to restore the benefits obtained.”); NEEDHAM & 
POLLACK, supra note 38, § 11.8 (noting that a judgment debtor would have to resort “to the 
permissive remedy of . . . restitution” should he succeed on appeal).  However, in cases where the 
party defending against the appeal levies and executes on the underlying cause of action and the 
appeal itself, then purchases those chose in action at the execution sale intending to dismiss it, the 
appeal does not survive.  See, e.g., RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1075.  Moreover, because the appeal 
is never heard on the merits, the judgment debtor has no hope of recovering “the benefits obtained” 
by the judgment creditor.  See id. 
 87.  Gridley, supra note 52, at 756 (noting that a writ of execution is preferred over other 
methods for enforcing a judgment). 
 88.  See Cnty. Trust Co. v. Berg, 318 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (Sup. Ct. 1971). 
 89.  Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762, 767–68 (10th Cir. 2010); Paglia v. 
Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 90.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1071. 
 91.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS intro. note c (1980). 
 92.  Gridley, supra note 52, at 755–56 (focusing primarily on intellectual property rights).   
 93.  Id. 
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At common law, choses in action are inalienable and are thus not subject 
to execution.94  Therefore, if choses in action are subject to execution at all it 
is because a state statute authorizes execution on them.95  Indeed, “most 
states . . . have abrogated that common law by statute.”96  However, just as 
state statutes vary in what types of property they deem subject to execution, 
states also vary on whether they deem all categories of choses in action to be 
reachable by execution or only some.97  For example, some states allow 
judgment creditors to reach debts but do not permit execution on pending 
choses in action.98  Other states have exceedingly broad execution statutes 
that allow judgment creditors to execute on all of a judgment debtor’s 
property, including pending choses in action or even potential choses in 
action that have not yet been asserted.99 
Of the states that allow execution on pending choses in action, some 
may explicitly authorize execution on all choses in action.100  Others simply 
 
 94.  Woody’s Olympia Lumber, Inc., v. Roney, 513 P.2d 849, 850 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973); 
Gridley, supra note 52, at 775. 
 95.  See, e.g., Prodigy Ctrs./Atlanta v. T-C Assocs., 501 S.E.2d 209, 211 n.3 (Ga. 1998) (citing 
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-13-57 (West 1996) (“Choses in action are not liable to be seized and sold under 
execution, unless made so specifically by statute.”)); Woody’s, 513 P.2d at 850 (citing WASH. REV. 
CODE § 6.04.060 (1972) (Washington’s statute enables execution on “all property, real and 
personal.”)). 
 96.  Woody’s, 513 P.2d at 850. 
 97.  See Gridley, supra note 52, at 766–67 (describing procedural alternatives available in 
various states for reaching intangible assets). 
 98.  This Comment is only concerned with those states that allow execution upon most or all 
choses in action, including unliquidated tort claims and pending choses in action.  Thus, states that 
do not allow execution on this type of chose in action warrant no further discussion here.  See, e.g., 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 699.720(a)(3) (West 2009) (pending choses in action not subject to 
execution).  Interestingly, California allowed a judgment creditor to execute on choses in action 
against itself until 1941, when the legislature enacted a statute disallowing the tactic.  Denham v. 
Farmers Ins. Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1061, 1071 (1989) (describing the development of California 
law); Abbati v. Eldridge, 103 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487 (1980) (same); see also Everts v. Will S. 
Fawcett Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 213, 217 (1937) (allowing defendant to execute on a claim against 
itself); Meserve v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 2d 468, 472 (1934) (same).  California now allows a 
judgment creditor to obtain a lien on pending choses in action, but such a lien is enforceable only 
after the chose in action has been reduced to judgment and the time for appeal has expired.  CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 708.410(a), 708.480 (West 2010).  Other states have different approaches.  See, 
e.g., Prodigy Ctrs., 501 S.E.2d at 211 n.3 (“Choses in action are not liable to be seized and sold 
under execution unless made so specially by statute.”); Haines v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 218 N.E.2d 727 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (holding that choses in action are not subject to a writ of attachment or 
garnishment).  Sometimes, there are procedural tools to reach causes of action in place of execution, 
for example, garnishment.  See Cagle v. Butcher, 575 P.2d 321, 323 (Ariz. 1978). 
 99.  See Woody’s, 513 P.2d at 853–54 (“Our statute is sufficiently broad to include unliquidated 
tort claims even if of dubious value, and we see no reason to limit by judicial construction or 
prohibit the judicial process of attachment or execution by excluding such claims.”). 
 100.  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.080(1) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-28-1 (2009) (as 
interpreted by In re Howe, 232 B.R. 534 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999)).  Despite the broad language of 
these statutes, one must proceed with caution.  For example, Arizona provides a somewhat baffling 
example of how misleading these statutes can be.  Cagle, 575 P.2d at 323.  Arizona’s general 
execution statute provides for execution upon “[s]hares and interest in a corporation, and debts and 
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authorize execution upon all property of the judgment debtor.101  Within this 
category, other variations exist within each state’s case law, such as those 
states that allow execution only on those claims that are transferrable.102 
In sum, for a defendant to execute on choses in action against itself, it 
must first be in a state that allows judgment creditors to execute on choses in 
action.103  Because there is no clear rule that applies in every state, one must 
look to the law of the forum to determine which choses in action are subject 
to execution and under what circumstances.104  However, even if a state 
allows judgment creditors to execute on choses in action in general, there 
may be constitutional protections associated with choses in action that 
prevent a judgment creditor from obtaining choses in action against itself 
through a writ of execution.105 
D.   Constitutional Protections Associated with Choses in Action 
The United States Constitution and most state constitutions have 
guarantees associated with choses in action that are implicated when a 
 
credits, choses in action, and all other property, or any interest therein, legal or equitable, not capable 
of manual delivery, may be levied upon and sold under execution.”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12-1558 (2009).  This statute appears to fall squarely within the broad authorization of states like 
Washington and Oregon.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.090 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.345 
(2009).  However, in Cagle, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the proper method for reaching a 
chose in action was garnishment and not execution.  Cagle, 575 P.2d at 323.  The court cited 
Arizona Revised Statutes section 12-1559, which prescribes the method for levy and sale of a 
judgment debtor’s property upon execution of a judgment.  Id.  The court reasoned that section 
12-1559 outlines “a procedure for levying on certain intangibles such as the stock of a corporation or 
an interest in a partnership, but no similar procedure is provided for a chose in action.”  Id.  
Arizona’s execution procedure statute still does not provide a procedure for execution of choses in 
action; thus, Cagle is still good law.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1559 (2009). 
 101.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 18.345 (2009); UTAH R. CIV. P. 69A(c); WASH. REV. CODE § 
6.17.090 (2011).  These states’ statutes usually include a list of exempt property.  See, e.g., OR. REV. 
STAT. § 18.345(a)–(o) (2009) (exempting, for example, household goods, tools of the debtor’s trade, 
clothing, and an automobile, that are below a certain amount in value). 
 102.  See Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578, 580–81 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).  Missouri falls into 
the category of states that do not allow assignment of choses in action that do not survive the 
holder’s death, and the courts have held that they cannot compel assignment of property that a debtor 
cannot assign voluntarily.  See id. at 580.  On the other hand, Washington falls into the same 
category, forbidding the transfer of tort claims that do not survive the death of the claimant, but does 
allow courts to compel assignment of those claims through execution.  See Woody’s, 513 P.2d at 
853.  Thus, assignability may or may not be a salient factor in whether property is subject to 
execution.  If a litigant is in a state that has not yet decided the issue, it is certainly worth arguing. 
 103.  See Woody’s, 513 P.2d at 850; Gridley, supra note 52, at 775. 
 104.  See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
 105.  See, e.g., Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. App. 1992). 
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judgment creditor attempts to execute on choses in action against itself.106  
For example, the United States Constitution guarantees a right to a jury trial 
in some civil cases.107  At least one court, the Court of Appeals of Texas, has 
stated that a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial may be violated when a judgment 
creditor extinguishes a claim against itself using a writ of execution.108  
However, in a majority of federal jurisdictions, this right is attached only to 
claims that would have had the right to a jury trial in 1791.109  Thus, the right 
is associated with the claim—a chose in action—and probably transfers with 
it.110  Many state constitutions also guarantee a right to a jury trial, along 
with other rights such as a right of access to the courts.111 
Forty state constitutions guarantee their citizens the right of access to the 
courts of those states and the right to a remedy through “open courts 
clauses.”112  Despite general similarities in the wording of these clauses 
(there are two main archetypes), courts have varied widely in their 
interpretation of these guarantees.113  Some states view the right as “little 
more than . . . [a] historical relic,” and others view it as “second only to the 
 
 106.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 15 (right of access to the 
courts and the right to a jury trial). 
 107.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 108.  Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. App. 1992).  The court 
in Associated noted in passing that allowing a judgment creditor to execute on choses in action 
against itself “has the effect of denying [plaintiff] the right to a jury trial,” but decided the case on 
other grounds.  Id.  It is unclear whether the court was discussing the federal Constitution or Texas 
constitution. 
 109.  STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 559 (7th ed. 2008). 
 110.  Cf. Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 702–03 (Utah 2002).  In Applied 
Medical, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the Utah constitution’s guarantee of a citizen’s right of 
access to the courts is not violated when a judgment creditor executes on choses in action against 
itself because the right transfers with the claim.  Id.  This is probably sufficiently analogous to the 
right to a jury trial to conclude that the right to a jury trial is also transferred when one transfers a 
claim.  See id.  After all, one cannot claim a right to a trial by jury if one does not even have the right 
to appear in court. 
 111.  See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 15. 
 112.  Thomas R. Phillips, Speech, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 
1310 (2003).  The rights guaranteed by these clauses are known by other names, depending on the 
states.  Id. at 1317.  Some of these names include: “access to the courts,” “remedies,” “right to the 
courts,” “certain remedy,” “guaranteed remedy,” “right to a remedy,” or “remedy due course of 
law.”  Id. at 1317 n.33. 
 113.  Id. at 1314.  According to Judge Phillips, one type reads: 
That every person for every injury done him in his goods, land or person, ought to have 
[a] remedy by the course of the law of the land and ought to have justice and right for the 
injury done to him freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without 
delay, according to the law of the land. 
Id. at 1311.  This type can be found in eleven state constitutions.  Id.  The second type is more 
concise: “That all courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by the due course of the law.”  Id.  Judge Phillips notes 
that twenty-seven states use this form.  Id.  This amounts to thirty-eight states with an explicit open 
courts clause.  See id.  Presumably, the other two states recognizing the right have implied its 
existence.  See id. 
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due process clause in importance.”114  Courts have used open courts clauses 
for such varied purposes as invalidating statutes that impose restrictions on 
the right to bring medical malpractice claims, invalidating statutes of repose, 
invalidating statutes allowing defamers to retract their statements, and 
opening court proceedings to the public.115 
Some litigants have argued before various state courts that allowing 
judgment creditors to execute on choses in action against themselves 
violates plaintiffs’ right of access to the courts.116  So far, the Court of 
Appeals of Texas is the only court to have accepted that argument, reasoning 
that when a litigant is divested of a claim, she loses standing to appear in 
court and her claim is extinguished, effectively depriving her of that right.117  
The Supreme Court of Utah, on the other hand, has held that the right to 
appear in court is not a personal right of the individual; rather, it is a right 
that is vested in the person who holds the chose in action.118  Thus, when a 
chose in action is transferred, the right of access to the courts transfers with 
 
 114.  Id. at 1314 (quoting William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A 
Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 333, 341 (1997)). 
 115.  Id. at 1311–12. 
 116.  See, e.g., Marantha Faith Ctr., Inc. v. Colonial Trust Co., 904 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (Miss. 
2004) (refusing to consider the argument because it was not argued before the trial court). 
 117.  Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. App. 1992).  The claim 
and all rights attached to it would be extinguished because when a judgment creditor obtains choses 
in action against itself, “any justiciable controversy is extinguished.”  Id. at 306.  In contrast, when a 
third party purchases claims, he has the same incentive to litigate those claims as the former plaintiff.  
See Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. App. 1992).  Justiciability is 
destroyed because the parties to the suit (i.e., the judgment creditor versus the judgment debtor) are 
no longer adverse, thus running afoul of the Case or Controversy Clause of the United States 
Constitution and the justiciability requirements of many states.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 
Hoffert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[W]here both litigants desire the 
same result, there can be no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.”); see also In re 
A.M.S., 277 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. App. 2009) (“The test for constitutional standing in Texas requires 
that there (a) shall be a real controversy between the parties, which (b) will be actually determined 
by the judicial declaration sought.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But see, e.g., Lansing Sch. 
Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 695 (Mich. 2010) (“Michigan courts’ judicial 
power to decide controversies was broader than the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the art. III case-or-controversy limits on the federal judicial power because a state sovereign 
possesses inherent powers that the federal government does not.”). 
 118.  Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 702–03 (Utah 2002).  The court explained 
that choses in action and the rights associated with them are regularly transferred.  Id.  When a party 
purchases a chose in action, he steps into the shoes of the former plaintiff, and the former plaintiff’s 
rights are entirely cut off through a loss of standing.  Id.  The new plaintiff “has the right to 
determine the course and scope of the litigation of the claims purchased, including the right to move 
to dismiss the pending claims.”  Id. at 703.  For a thorough discussion of both Applied Medical and 
Criswell, see infra notes 178–89. 
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it.119  Still, there is some validity to the argument that if a judgment creditor 
obtains a chose in action against itself, the chose in action and the 
corresponding right to appear in court is automatically extinguished because 
justiciability is destroyed,120 thus violating a state’s open courts clause.121 
If an open courts clause acts to bar execution at all, it will only bar 
execution on claims at the trial court level.122  This is because as a general 
rule, the right to an appeal is not constitutionally guaranteed.123  Apparently, 
the only state constitution that provides that litigants are entitled a civil 
appeal of right is Utah’s.124  However, under Utah’s case law, that section 
probably does not prohibit a judgment creditor from executing on a 
judgment debtor’s choses in action because the right to appeal is vested in 
whoever holds the right to bring a claim, just like the right of access to the 
courts.125 
Thus, there are several rights attached to choses in action that transfer 
with the chose in action when it is sold or otherwise changes hands.126  
However, there is some authority for the proposition that when a judgment 
creditor obtains a chose in action against itself the claim is extinguished 
along with its associated rights.127  Which interpretation applies depends on 
how the forum state interprets its constitutional provisions.128 
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
There are only about twenty-five cases that have touched on the issue of 
whether a judgment creditor can obtain choses in action against itself to 
 
 119.  Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 703. 
 120.  Criswell, 843 S.W.2d at 306. 
 121.  Id. at 306–07. 
 122.  MP Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 123.  See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (“This Court has recognized that if a full and 
fair trial on the merits is provided, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
require a state to provide appellate review . . . .”); MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936 (“MP Medical has no 
constitutional right to appeal in this case . . . .”). 
 124.  UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (“Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, 
there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.”).  Ironically, Utah is also one of the states that allows a 
judgment creditor to execute on choses in action against itself.  See Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 703. 
 125.  So far, there is no binding Utah precedent considering this issue.  One Utah litigant has 
argued that article eight, section five, bars a judgment creditor from executing on an appeal against 
itself, but the trial court rejected this argument outright.  Innnerlight, Inc. v. The Matrix Grp., LLC, 
No. 060400775, 2007 WL 7210447, at *2–3 (4th Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah Sept. 18, 2007) (error in 
spelling of “Innerlight” in original).  The court cited Applied Medical in support of its holding and 
ruled that the claim “belongs to the claim holder.”  Id. at *3 (citing Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 702–
03). 
 126.  Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 702–03. 
 127.  Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). 
 128.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 9 (1995) (noting that state courts are free to interpret their 
constitutions as they see fit). 
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satisfy a judgment, and these are scattered across thirteen different 
jurisdictions.129  Of the states that allow execution upon all choses in action, 
few have directly confronted the issue of whether a judgment creditor can 
execute on choses in action against itself and issued a clear ruling on how 
lower courts are to proceed.  Most that have considered the issue have either 
done so from a slightly different procedural perspective,130 decided the case 
 
 129.  See Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762 (10th Cir. 2010); RMA 
Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2009); FM. Indus., Inc. v. 
Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 2d 795 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Heritage Corp. of S. Fla. v. Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 01-003519-CIV, 2008 WL 4858244 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 
2008); Tax Track Sys. Corp. v. New Investor World, Inc., No. 01 C 6217, 2006 WL 1648491 (N.D. 
Ill. June 6, 2006); Everts v. Will S. Fawcett Co., 74 P.2d 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937) (abrogated by 
statute); Meserve v. Superior Court, 38 P.2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (same); Donan v. Dolce Vita 
Sa, Inc., 992 So. 2d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, 512 
N.W.2d 303 (Iowa 1994); Brenton Bros. v. Dorr, 239 N.W. 808 (Iowa 1931); Citizens Nat’l Bank v. 
Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 2006); Baker v. Tullock, 77 P.2d 1035, 1035 
(Mont. 1938); Brandstetter v. Boyd, No. 54229, 2010 WL 4684450 (Nev. Nov. 12, 2010); Crenshaw 
v. Conrad, No. 49746, 2008 WL 6102109 (Nev. Sept. 12, 2008); Criswell, 843 S.W.2d 304; 
Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App. 1992); Commerce Sav. Ass’n v. 
Welch, 783 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App. 1989); Applied Med., 44 P.3d 699; Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & 
Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208 (Utah 1999); Golden Meadows Props., LC v. Strand, 241 P.3d 371 
(Utah Ct. App. 2010); Cosby v. Cazares, No. 20091035-CA, 2010 WL 3795133 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 
30, 2010) (per curiam); Innnerlight, 2007 WL 7210447; MP Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009); Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Johnson v. 
Dahlquist, 225 P. 817 (Wash. 1924). 
 130.  The most common alternative procedural posture besides a challenge to a writ of execution 
is a challenge to a judgment creditor’s motion for the outright assignment of the debtor’s chose in 
action to the judgment creditor.  See Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 762 (“We conclude that 
the district court’s outright transfer of a chose in action alleging damages far in excess of the value 
of the judgment at issue was an abuse of discretion.”); Tax Track, 2006 WL 1648491, at *1 (refusing 
to assign a judgment debtor’s chose in action against the judgment creditor to the judgment creditor); 
Criswell, 843 S.W.2d at 306 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the 
turnover of plaintiff’s choses in action against defendant because such a turnover extinguishes the 
cause of action); Associated Ready Mix, 843 S.W.2d at 762–63 (same); Commerce Sav., 783 S.W.2d 
at 671 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant such a turnover 
order, but refusing to comment on the legality of such an order).  Those courts that have considered 
such assignments have roundly condemned them, often in no uncertain terms.  See, e.g., Tax Track, 
2006 WL 1648491, at *1 (“[S]uch an interpretation of the statute would result in the extinction of 
every appeal from an adverse judgment by an impecunious judgment debtor.  This court will not 
interpret the statute that broadly, or reach such an absurd result.”).  Judge Lucero of the Tenth 
Circuit, writing for the majority in Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 767, makes clear that such 
attitudes are based, at least in part, on the lack of the “key safeguard” of a public execution sale.  
Thus, they are not quite on point for this Comment, which is only concerned with execution.  
However, because many of the concerns in the turnover or assignment contexts are applicable in the 
execution context, some of the arguments made in these cases are considered.  See Associated Ready 
Mix, 843 S.W.2d at 763 (acknowledging that the trial court could have placed the choses in action in 
the hands of a receiver to be sold, but suggesting that placing the choses in action in the hands of a 
receiver who would then pursue them to their fullest value would be a more desirable procedure than 
a public auction). 
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on other grounds,131 or issued unpublished opinions with little value as 
guides for future litigants or examples for other courts.132  Consequently, 
there is a dearth of case law on the topic. 
Of the jurisdictions that have confronted the issue, Washington and Utah 
have the most developed case law.133  Washington vests the trial court with 
discretion to refuse to issue a writ of execution to prevent a judgment 
creditor from obtaining the opposing side of a lawsuit against itself if “the 
demands of justice to all parties can be reasonably satisfied.”134  In contrast, 
Utah allows a judgment creditor to obtain both sides of a lawsuit using a writ 
of execution with a limited public policy exception for the execution and 
purchase of legal malpractice claims by lawyers.135  By examining the cases 
from these jurisdictions and comparing them with cases from other 
jurisdictions where appropriate, one can gain insight into how courts have 
approached the problem and what factors have influenced their decisions. 
A.  Washington’s Discretionary Approach 
Washington is the state with the longest history of cases dealing with 
this tactic, with the first reported instance of a judgment creditor executing 
on a chose in action against itself in 1924.136  Washington’s execution statute 
is extremely broad and allows execution on “[a]ll property, real and 
 
 131.  See, e.g., RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076.  In RMA Ventures, the court upheld the validity 
of the execution sale, in part because plaintiff failed to challenge the writ of execution at the proper 
time.  Id.  It should be noted, however, that the court’s decision was also based on the fact that Utah 
law allows a judgment debtor to execute upon choses in action against itself.  See id. at 1075. 
 132.  Nevada is a prime example of this.  See Brandstetter, 2010 WL 4684450, at *1 (defendant 
validly purchased plaintiff’s cause of action and appeal against defendant to satisfy the same 
judgment under review on appeal); Crenshaw, 2008 WL 6102109, at *1 (same).  From these orders 
it is clear that Nevada, as a practical matter, allows execution by a judgment creditor upon choses in 
action against itself.  However, a litigant can cite no precedent from within the state that is directly 
on point, because Nevada does not allow citation to unpublished opinions.  See NEV. SUP. CT. R. 
123.  Interestingly, both of these cases cite a California opinion, Denham v. Farmers Insurance Co., 
262 Cal. Rptr. 146, 152 (Ct. App. 1989), in which a California appellate court interpreted Nevada 
Revised Statutes sections 21.080 and 10.045 as allowing a judgment creditor to execute upon a third 
party judgment debtor’s cause of action against his insurance company.  See Brandstetter, 2010 WL 
4684450, at *1 n.1; Crenshaw, 2008 WL 6102109, at *1.  It seems odd that the Nevada Supreme 
Court would decline to interpret its own state’s statutes or at least explicitly adopt the California 
interpretation in a published opinion. 
 133.  Washington has three cases directly on point.  See MP Med., 213 P.3d at 931; Paglia, 522 
P.2d at 511; Johnson, 225 P. at 817.  Utah has two Supreme Court cases, one decision in which the 
Tenth Circuit applied Utah law, two unpublished opinions, and one Court of Appeals opinion that 
touches on the issue.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076; Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 701–02; 
Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 209; Golden Meadows, 241 P.3d at 374 (dicta); Cosby, 2010 WL 3795133, at 
*2 (per curiam); Innnerlight, 2007 WL 7210447, at *3. 
 134.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 513. 
 135.  Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 701–02. 
 136.  Johnson, 225 P. at 817. 
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personal, of the judgment debtor that is not exempted by law.”137  Although 
there are only three cases that confront the question of whether a judgment 
creditor can execute on choses in action against itself, no jurisdiction has 
more reported cases.  Although Washington has now adopted a discretionary 
approach that appears to disfavor the tactic, the first cases in which the court 
confronted the tactic upheld its validity.138 
In Johnson v. Dahlquist, the Supreme Court of Washington considered 
plaintiff’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion to quash a writ of 
execution issued against plaintiff’s pending claim of debt against 
defendant.139  The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that a writ of execution could not issue against claims that were 
unliquidated and undetermined, holding that Washington’s execution statute 
was “all inclusive” and therefore encompassed such claims.140  The court 
then rejected plaintiff’s arguments that a defendant could not execute on 
claims against itself: 
[I]t is contended that the respondents should not be permitted to 
levy upon that which they themselves owe to the judgment debtor.  
But why not?  It is property.  It is capable of being transferred.  It is 
capable of being converted into a judgment which is subject to 
execution.  It is an asset of the judgment debtor, and why should not 
his assets, whatever their nature, be taken to satisfy a judgment?  
We cannot see any logical reason why such property should not be 
levied on.141 
 
 137.  WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.090 (2011).  This particular version of statute was enacted in 
1987.  However, Washington has had almost identical execution statutes in force continuously since 
at least 1922.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.04.060 (repealed 1987) (“[A]ll property, real and personal, 
of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, shall be liable to execution.”); Johnson, 225 P. at 818 
(citing REM. COMP. STAT. § 518 (1922)) (same).  Washington has interpreted this statute to allow 
writs of execution to issue upon unliquidated tort claims whether they are assignable or not.  
Woody’s Olympia Lumber, Inc. v. Roney, 513 P.2d 849, 853–54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). 
 138.  Johnson, 225 P. at 818. 
 139.  Id. at 817.  Plaintiff sued defendant over a debt and obtained a judgment for $1700, and 
defendant appealed.  Id.  The case was remanded, and the appellate court entered a judgment for 
costs on appeal in favor of defendant.  Id.  To satisfy the judgment for costs, defendant sought a writ 
of execution against plaintiff’s remanded claim.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 818.  The court acknowledged that “[u]nder the common law, . . . choses in action 
were not subject to execution; but in most of the states, as here, the common law in this respect has 
been abrogated by statute.”  Id.  It held that the legislature was competent to make such property 
subject to levy and execution, and that it did so through Washington’s broadly drafted statute.  Id. 
 141.  Id.  This paragraph is often quoted by courts in other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Citizens State 
Bank of Des Moines v. Hansen, 449 N.W.2d 388, 389–90 (Iowa 1989); Brenton Bros. v. Dorr, 239 
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With this decision, Washington was the first state to allow a judgment 
creditor to execute claims against itself.142   
 The Washington courts first adopted their current discretionary 
approach in Paglia v. Breskovich.143  In this breach of contract case, 
defendant’s attorney, Paglia, purchased a judgment against plaintiff from a 
judgment creditor in an unrelated action, obtained a general writ of 
execution against plaintiff’s claims against defendant, and purchased those 
claims at the subsequent execution sale.144  Plaintiff did not contest the writ 
of execution until after the sale took place and Paglia moved to substitute 
himself as plaintiff.145 
The issue before the court of appeals was whether there was any 
equitable relief which the trial court could have invoked to set aside an 
execution sale “when the sale completely destroys the judgment debtor’s 
ability to prosecute the independent cause of action.”146  The court noted that 
a more recent case from the Supreme Court of Washington, United Pacific 
Insurance Co. v. Lundstrom,147 indicated a departure from Johnson because 
it overturned a writ of execution that issued against a judgment that was still 
contingent and uncertain even after it was entered and that apparently would 
have permitted a double recovery.148  The Paglia court saw no difference 
between a judgment that was uncertain after it was entered and a claim that 
was uncertain because it had not yet been reduced to judgment, and 
 
N.W. 808, 813 (Iowa 1931); Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 
1009 (Miss. 2006) (concluding that Mississippi statutory law allows a defendant to levy upon a 
plaintiff judgment debtor’s choses in action against the defendant to satisfy a judgment); Marantha 
Faith Ctr., Inc. v. Colonial Trust Co., 904 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (Miss. 2004) (quoted in support of the 
court’s holding that choses in action are subject to execution). 
 142.  Johnson, 225 P. at 818. 
 143.  522 P.2d 511 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied 84 Wash. 2d 1004 (1974). 
 144.  Id. at 511–12.  Paglia’s cleverness and sheer audacity is worth acknowledging.  Paglia first 
purchased one judgment against plaintiff, obtained a writ of execution against the plaintiff’s claims, 
and purchased them for $750.  Id. at 512.  He then attempted to fire plaintiff’s attorney and moved to 
substitute himself as plaintiff.  Id.  Plaintiff moved to set aside the execution sale.  Id.  In its ruling 
on the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court allowed the plaintiff fourteen days to come up with sufficient 
funds to satisfy the judgment before it would uphold the sale.  Id.  Plaintiff did so, borrowing the 
money, and returned triumphantly to inform the court.  Id.  However, in the interim, Paglia had 
purchased another outstanding judgment against the plaintiff (there were three outstanding 
judgments against the plaintiff totaling roughly $20,000) and obtained a second writ of execution for 
the plaintiff’s claims.  Id.  Paglia bought the claims again and filed a second motion to substitute.  Id.  
The plaintiff had exhausted his resources and could not pay, so this second motion is the one the trial 
court ultimately ruled on.  Id.  Paglia was honest about his aims: “We are intending to take away 
their ability to prosecute the action.  I mean make no mistake about it.”  Id. (quoting the record on 
appeal). 
 145.  Id. at 514.  The trial court granted the motion to substitute even though it was “obviously 
distressed at its inability to grant any type of equitable relief which [plaintiff] sought.”  Id. at 512. 
 146.  Id. at 513. 
 147.  459 P.2d 930, 936 (Wash. 1969). 
 148.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514. 
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concluded that the Lundstrom court was trying to avoid a grossly inequitable 
result.149 
The Paglia court reasoned that “[e]ither the Johnson rule has been or 
ought to be discarded, or else the court ought to exercise its supervisory 
power over its own process to prevent one party from obtaining control and 
management of both ends of one lawsuit.”150  The court acknowledged that 
the judgment debtor failed to contest the writ of execution prior to the sale, 
but held that “[i]f a trial court can exercise its inherent powers to prevent the 
likely development of a grossly inequitable result, a fortiori, it ought to be 
able to exercise the same powers after the inequitable situation develops.”151  
This power is “exercisable when the demands of justice to all parties can be 
reasonably satisfied.”152  Thus, the court of appeals reversed the decision of 
the trial court, denying Paglia’s motion to substitute himself as plaintiff and 
granting the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the execution sale.153 
 
 149.  Id.  The court also acknowledged that a somewhat different interpretation of Lundstrom 
appears in Woody’s Olympia Lumber, Inc. v. Roney, 513 P.2d 849, 852 (Wash. 1973).  Paglia, 522 
P.2d at 514 n.2.  In Woody’s, the Supreme Court of Washington held that an unliquidated tort claim 
is subject to execution.  Woody’s, 513 P.2d at 853–54.  It interpreted Lundstrom as holding that a 
claim is subject to levy and execution if it is capable of being rendered mathematically certain when 
judgment is entered.  Id. at 852. 
 150.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514.  The court cited Brenton Bros. v. Dorr, 239 N.W. 808, 810 (Iowa 
1931), in which the Iowa Supreme Court, faced with a judgment creditor attempting to execute upon 
a judgment debtor’s counterclaim against the judgment creditor, held that a court may grant a 
reasonable stay of execution if the applicant for the stay can show that execution would prejudice 
him in independent proceedings.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514.  Iowa has faced the issue at least once 
more since Brenton Bros.  In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, the Iowa Supreme Court 
considered whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff judgment debtor’s request for a stay 
of execution against its choses in action against the judgment creditor.  512 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 
1994).  The court reiterated that the trial court has discretion to grant a stay, and its decision will not 
be disturbed unless “the discretion is capriciously exercised or abused.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court found it significant that if the judgment debtor was allowed to pursue her 
claims she may ultimately lose and exhaust the value of the claims in the process, leaving no value 
for the judgment creditor to recover.  Id.  Also, the court reasoned, the judgment creditor will receive 
some value in the transaction, in the form of a reduction in the amount of the judgment against her.  
Id. 
 151.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514. 
 152.  Id. at 513. 
 153.  Id.  Chief Judge Pearson joined in the majority opinion, but wrote a separate concurring 
opinion to discuss a few additional reasons for reversal.  Id. at 515.  In light of Paglia’s position as 
the defendant’s attorney, Judge Pearson wrote that “[p]ublic policy should not condone the action of 
counsel for one party to a lawsuit in acquiring ownership of the interest . . . of the client’s adversary” 
and that such actions are “specifically prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility, CPR 5, 
DR 5-103(A).”  Id.  He continued: 
Furthermore, if the attorney acquires such interest of his client’s adversary for the sole 
purpose of winning the lawsuit by means other than on the merits, the action borders on 
abuse of legal process. . . .  This is particularly true where a great disparity exists between 
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Paglia’s holding appears to have gained a foothold in the Washington 
appellate courts, as evidenced by MP Medical Inc. v. Wegman.154  In that 
case, plaintiff sued defendants—plaintiff’s former employee and his new 
employer—for various claims arising out of the employee’s departure.155  
The trial court entered a judgment on the merits and a supplemental 
judgment for attorney’s fees in favor of the defendants.156  Plaintiff, now a 
judgment debtor, appealed from both the merits judgment and the award of 
attorney’s fees but failed to file a supersedeas undertaking to stay 
enforcement of the judgment.157  Defendant sought a writ of execution 
against plaintiff’s appeal, and the trial court issued the writ over plaintiff’s 
timely objections.158  The Court of Appeals of Washington granted 
immediate review of the decision to issue the writ and the merits 
determination.159 
The court confronted defendant’s argument that Johnson makes clear 
that a judgment creditor can execute on claims against itself.160  It explained 
that Paglia represents an exception to the rule laid down in Johnson.161  
Paglia stands for the proposition that “allowing one party to control both 
sides of the lawsuit [is] ‘grossly inequitable’ because the judgment debtor 
would be deprived of the opportunity to establish his claim.”162  The court 
held that defendants could not execute on plaintiff’s cause of action to 
satisfy their judgment for attorney’s fees, and that the trial court should have 
exercised control over its own process to avoid such an unjust result: 
 
the potential value of the cause of action levied upon as compared with the amount of the 
judgment debt. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 154.  213 P.3d 931 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).  Paglia has also been accepted by Florida courts.  
Donan v. Dolce Vita Sa, Inc., 992 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see also Heritage 
Corp. of S. Fla. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 01-003519-CIV, 2008 WL 
4858244 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2008) (refusing to issue a writ of execution against a judgment debtor’s 
chose in action).  Florida does not allow execution on personal injury claims, but breach of contract 
claims like the one in Donan are ordinarily subject to execution.  Donan, 992 So. 2d at 861.  
However, when the judgment creditor in Donan tried to execute on the judgment debtor’s appeal 
through supplementary proceedings, the court stated: “This is a case of first impression in Florida 
and we, like the trial court, are persuaded by the Washington Court’s opinion in Paglia.”  Id. 
 155.  MP Med., 213 P.3d at 933–34.  Plaintiff’s claims were for breach of contract, tortious 
interference with a business relationship, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and 
trade secret violations.  Id. at 934. 
 156.  Id. at 933–34. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 935. 
 161.  Id. at 935–36. 
 162.  Id. at 936. 
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[W]e do not agree with Paglia’s suggestion that the Johnson rule 
has been discarded.[163]  But we do agree with Paglia that the trial 
court has supervisory authority over its own process and should 
exercise that power to prevent the grossly inequitable situation 
where one party destroys the opposing party’s cause of action by 
becoming the owner of the cause of action under review. . . .  While 
MP Medical has no constitutional right to appeal in this case, 
allowing one party to destroy the opposing party’s appeal by 
becoming its owner through enforcement of the very judgment 
under review is fundamentally unjust.  The trial court erred when it 
failed to exercise its inherent power to prevent this from 
happening.164 
The court then turned to the trial court’s decision on the merits and the 
award of attorney’s fees, affirmed both, and awarded defendants additional 
attorney’s fees and costs for the appeal.165  Even though the plaintiff’s appeal 
was unsuccessful on the merits, MP Medical is significant in that the court 
of appeals reaffirmed its commitment to Paglia and refused to allow a writ 
of execution to issue against plaintiff’s choses in action against defendant. 
Thus, from these cases it is clear that Washington generally allows writs 
of execution to issue on choses in action.166  However, when a judgment 
creditor seeks to execute on a claim against itself in order to gain control of 
both sides of a lawsuit and extinguish the claim, a Washington court is to 
exercise its authority over its own process to prevent an inequitable result.167 
B. Utah’s Bright-Line Rule 
Utah’s bright-line rule starkly contrasts with Washington’s discretionary 
approach in that it allows judgment creditors to execute on a claim against 
themselves regardless of the circumstances of the case.168  There is only one 
 
 163.  To clarify, Paglia suggested, but did not determine, that the Johnson rule had been 
discarded; rather, it determined that it was one of two possible interpretations of Lundquist, and the 
less likely one at that.  Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 514 (Wash. 1974).  The second possible 
interpretation, according to Paglia, was that Lundquist meant that a trial court could use its inherent 
power over its own process to avoid an inequitable result.  Id.  The Paglia court determined that the 
second interpretation was more likely the correct one.  Id. 
 164.  MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 165.  Id. at 941. 
 166.  See Johnson v. Dahlquist, 225 P. 817 (Wash. 1924). 
 167.  See MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936; see also Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514. 
 168.  Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 701–02 (Utah 2002); Snow, Nuffer, 
Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 209 (Utah 1999); see also UTAH R. CIV. P. 69A(c) (the 
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exception to Utah’s rule: based on public policy, attorneys and law firms 
may not execute on legal malpractice claims against themselves.169 
The Utah Supreme Court created the legal malpractice exception in the 
same case in which it first encountered the tactic: Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & 
Drake v. Tanasse.170  In Tanasse, the judgment creditor—a law firm that 
obtained a default judgment against its former client for unpaid legal fees—
obtained a writ of execution upon the client’s legal malpractice claim filed in 
a separate lawsuit against the law firm and purchased the claims at the 
subsequent sale.171  The client filed a motion to set aside the sale, which was 
denied by the trial court and affirmed by the court of appeals.172  The Utah 
Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals “that a legal malpractice 
claim can be reached through an involuntary transfer such as execution.”173  
The court went a step further, holding that Utah’s “writ of execution rules 
are quite broad and, absent legislative proscription, encompass unliquidated 
tort claims, including legal negligence actions.”174  However, the court 
ultimately reversed the court of appeals’s decision because allowing a law 
firm to execute on the client’s claims against it would violate public 
policy.175  It explained: 
 
officer of the court may seize and sell intangible personal property of the judgment debtor); Tanasse, 
980 P.2d at 209 (citing former UTAH R. CIV. P. 69(f) (repealed 2004)) (“The officer must execute the 
writ [of execution] against the non-exempt property of the judgment debtor by levying on a 
sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient property; collecting or selling the choses in action 
and selling the other property in the manner set forth herein.” (emphasis added)).  Though former 
Utah Rule 69(f) was repealed in 2004 and the new statutes do not explicitly mention choses in 
action, see Rule 69A, the new Rule allows execution on “intangible property” and Utah courts 
continue to allow execution on choses in action.  See, e.g., Cosby v. Cazares, No. 20091035-CA, 
2010 WL 3795133 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010); Golden Meadows Props., LC v. Strand, 241 P.3d 
371 (Utah Ct. App. 2010); Innnerlight, Inc. v. The Matrix Grp., LLC, No. 060400775, 2007 WL 
7210447 (4th Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah Sept. 19, 2007) (“[T]he Court finds that the Writ’s inclusion of 
choses of action as part of Defendant’s property is appropriate.”).  There are no decisions citing the 
new statute, and the new decisions all rely on pre-2004 precedent.  See, e.g., Innnerlight, 2007 WL 
7210447, at *3 (citing Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 702–03). 
 169.  Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 210. 
 170.  Id. at 209. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 210. 
 174.  Id. at 210–11 (referencing former UTAH R. CIV. P. 69(f) (repealed 2004)). 
 175.  Id. at 211.  Note that it is not the issuance of a writ of execution against legal malpractice 
claims that violates public policy, but the execution and purchase of those claims by the defendant 
law firm.  See id. at 210, 212.  Similarly, Nevada has a public policy exception that prevents any 
person from asserting a legal malpractice claim that “has been transferred by assignment or by levy 
and execution sale but was never pursued by the original client.”  Chaffee v. Smith, 645 P.2d 966, 
966 (Nev. 1982).  However, the Nevada Supreme Court reserved judgment in Chaffee as to whether 
a legal malpractice claim that has been asserted can be transferred.  Id.  Illinois also recognizes this 
limited public policy exception and does not allow execution on unfiled legal malpractice claims 
because, based on the personal nature of legal malpractice claims, they are not subject to assignment.  
Christison v. Jones, 405 N.E.2d 8, 9–11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that the “bare right to file a 
cause of action for legal malpractice” was not subject to execution); cf. Gonzalez v. Profile Sanding 
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 The acquisition of this legal malpractice claim 
by Snow Nuffer creates two problems.  First it has the effect of 
denying Tanasse the right to a trial on his claims [in violation of the 
Utah constitution’s open courts clause].  Snow Nuffer obviously has 
no intention to litigate a claim against itself . . . . 
 Second, the appropriate value of the legal malpractice claim will 
never be fairly determined. . . .  Snow Nuffer, whose incentives are 
in favor of under-valuation, purchased the claim and assigned it the 
value of $10,000. . . .  Tanasse’s claim against Snow Nuffer was 
predicated on a $102,000 judgment entered against him in a 
wrongful eviction case.  Tanasse’s [legal malpractice] cause of 
action could be worthless.  On the other hand, it could be 
of substantial value.  If we allow Snow Nuffer’s actions to stand, 
the true value of the action will never be determined, and yet 
Tanasse will remain liable not only for the judgment he claims was 
caused by  Snow Nuffer’s  negligence but also for the deficiency 
judgment on the execution.176 
 
Equip., Inc., 776 N.E.2d 667, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (denying motion for turnover of unfiled legal 
malpractice claims) (“Obviously, if the legislature opted to include ‘potential chose’ in the list of 
possible assets, it would have done so.  It did not, and we cannot read that condition into the 
statute.”).  However, there is authority supporting the proposition that, under Illinois law, once a 
legal malpractice claim is filed it may be subject to execution.  FM. Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit 
Servs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 2d 795, 799–800 (N.D. Ill. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(applying Illinois law) (holding that the defendant attorney could execute upon a judgment debtor’s 
currently pending legal malpractice claims against defendant to satisfy a judgment). 
 176.  Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 211–12 (citations omitted).  The second policy reason, the “value 
argument,” is a common argument in cases where a judgment creditor attempts to execute on choses 
in action against himself, which some courts appreciate and some dismiss outright.  Compare Paglia 
v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (Pearson, C.J., concurring) (“This is 
particularly true where a great disparity exists between the potential value of the cause of action 
levied upon as compared with the amount of the judgment debt.”), and RMA Ventures Cal. v. 
SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2009) (Lucero, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
actual value of a claim purchased by an opponent at auction will never be fairly determined.”), with 
Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 1010 (Miss. 2006) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that the value of its choses in action against the defendant could only be 
determined by a trial, stating that the “value—for purposes of levy and execution—is determined at a 
sheriff’s execution sale.”).  The argument has been more successful in cases where the outright 
assignment of a chose in action is at issue and no execution sale has or will take place.  Associated 
Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. App. 1992) (in a non-execution context, 
relying on the “value argument” in support of its holding that disallowed turnover of plaintiff’s 
choses in action against defendant); Commerce Sav. Ass’n v. Welch, 783 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. 
App. 1989) (same, stating “Welch’s cause of action against Commerce could conceivably be 
worthless.  On the other hand, it could be of considerable value.  Commerce’s strategy sought to 
preclude any determination of Welch’s rights against it in the lawsuit now pending in federal 
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The court recognized that this reasoning would apply when a judgment 
creditor attempts to acquire any unliquidated tort claim against itself not yet 
reduced to judgment, but it noted that “these problems take on special 
significance” in the context of the attorney-client relationship.177 
The case that conclusively established Utah’s general policy of allowing 
judgment creditors to execute upon choses in action against themselves was 
Applied Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Eames.178  In Applied Medical, 
defendant sought to execute on the plaintiff’s claims to satisfy a deficiency 
judgment it obtained against plaintiff in a prior foreclosure proceeding.179  
The trial court issued a writ of execution against the claims, and defendant 
purchased the claims at the sheriff’s sale.180  Both plaintiff’s trustee and 
attorney attended the sale but did not bid.181  Defendant then moved to 
dismiss the claims, and the trial court granted the motion over plaintiff’s 
protests.182 
 
court.”); see also Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762, 766 (10th Cir. 2010)  (in 
reversing the district court’s outright assignment of plaintiff’s chose in action against defendant to 
defendant, noting that “the Redmans contend their chose [in action] is worth $2.6 million, yet it was 
extinguished to satisfy a judgment of less than one twentieth of that total.”).  Finally, this rationale is 
the reason the California legislature ended the practice of execution on choses in action in 1941.  
Dehnam v. Farmers Ins. Co., 262 Cal. Rptr. 146, 152 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 177.  Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 212.  The court explained further, that “[a]lthough such a practice may 
be acceptable in cases not involving legal malpractice claims, we believe public confidence in both 
the legal profession and the legal process as a whole would be damaged if lawyers were allowed to 
execute on legal malpractice claims brought against them.”  Id.  The court declined to reach the issue 
of whether such practice is appropriate outside the legal malpractice context.  Id. at 212 n.3.  Justice 
Zimmerman, concurring and dissenting, agreed with the reasoning of the majority on all points 
except the scope of the prohibition.  Id. at 212–13 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting).  He 
advocated for “forbidding a lawyer to execute on a malpractice cause of action against that lawyer 
unless it is the only remaining asset of the debtor.”  Id. at 213.  He continued: “Such a rule would be 
sufficient to preclude a lawyer from finding a way to execute upon and extinguish a cause of action 
against that lawyer when the client had other assets available to satisfy the debt owed—the abusive 
possibility that seems to underlie the majority’s rule.”  Id.  He worried that the majority’s rule would 
“only serve to give the debtor additional and unjustified leverage over the lawyer in trying to settle 
such a suit for more than it is objectively worth.”  Id.  This potential solution is attractive if 
broadened beyond the context of a lawyer acquiring legal malpractice claims against himself and 
applied to execution upon all claims, although it also has its potential pitfalls.  See infra notes 306–
09, 340–44 and accompanying text. 
 178.  44 P.3d 699 (Utah 2002). 
 179.  Id. at 700.  The facts of this case are fairly complex.  Applied Medical, the judgment 
creditor, was formed by several of the parties to the lawsuit.  Id.  One of them, Mr. Eames, gave his 
shares in the company to his family trust, administered by his wife.  Id.  Another stockholder, Dr. 
Hill, initiated the foreclosure action against the trust in which the deficiency judgment was entered, 
and no appeal was taken from the judgment.  Id.  Several years later, the trust sued Applied Medical 
over claims regarding the trust’s stock, and Applied Medical, as the trust’s judgment creditor, sought 
to execute on the trust’s claims against itself.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 701. 
 182.  Id. 
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The court began by reiterating that, under Utah law, choses in action are 
subject to execution and that “judgment creditors can purchase any 
nonexempt property at a sheriff’s sale to satisfy the judgment that it has 
against the judgment debtor,” including claims against the judgment 
creditors themselves.183  It then rejected plaintiff’s argument that the tactic 
violated Utah’s open courts clause.184  The court acknowledged that “[a]t the 
very least, the open courts provision guarantees litigants access to the courts, 
i.e., a day in court, affording them the opportunity to litigate any justiciable 
controversy.”185  However, the court explained that the right is “inextricably 
connected with that claim,” and if that claim is transferred, the right to a day 
in court transfers with it.186  In addition, when a claim is transferred—
whether to the defendant or a third party—the result is the same: the former 
owner of the claims loses the right to pursue those claims.187  For this reason, 
the court saw no “difference between a defendant purchasing claims against 
itself and another purchasing those claims.”188  Therefore, the court held that 
the execution sale and the subsequent motion to dismiss did not violate the 
Utah constitution.189 
 
 183.  Id. at 702. 
 184.  Id.  Utah’s open courts clause provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 185.  Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 702. 
 186.  Id.  The court found it significant that “[i]ndeed, causes of action are regularly sold.”  Id.  It 
explained that once a claim is transferred, the new owner has all the rights of the former owner 
related to the claim, including “the right to determine the course and scope of the litigation of the 
claims purchased . . . [and] the right to move to dismiss the pending claims.”  Id. at 703. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id.  The court also noted that “the last clause of the open courts provision guarantees that an 
individual may ‘prosecut[e] or defend[ any civil action] before any tribunal in this State,’ so long as 
the individual is a party to the suit.”  Id. 
 189.  Id.  Of course, not all states interpret their open courts clauses in the same way as Utah.  For 
example, in Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, the Court of Appeals of Texas held that Texas’s open 
court clause prohibited a judgment creditor from using Texas’s turnover statute to obtain an 
opponent’s chose in action against the judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment.  843 S.W.2d 304, 
306–07 (Tex. App. 1992).  Texas has a much simpler open court clause than Utah, which reads: “All 
courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”  TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.  The court interpreted 
this section to mean that a litigant enjoys a specific guarantee of a right to access the courts that the 
legislature cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably interfere with.  Criswell, 843 S.W.2d at 306.  The court 
reasoned that Texas’s execution statute interferes with that right when a judgment creditor executes 
on a judgment debtor’s chose in action against the judgment creditor itself: 
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The court then turned to plaintiff’s argument that the public policy 
considerations in Tanasse were equally applicable to the present situation 
and should therefore be extended to preclude all judgment creditors from 
purchasing claims against themselves at an execution sale.190  The court 
pointed out that Tanasse explicitly limited its holding to attorneys because of 
concerns about undermining the attorney-client relationship and refused to 
extend the public policy exception to all judgment creditors.191  Finally, the 
court held that the execution sale was valid and affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss.192 
Another case decided under Utah law is of interest because it comes 
from the highest court to rule on the issue thus far.  In RMA Ventures 
California v. SunAmerica Life Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals for the 
 
When a judgment debtor’s cause of action against his judgment creditor is turned over to 
the judgment creditor, the judgment creditor becomes the holder of a cause of action 
against himself.  The judgment creditor becomes both plaintiff and defendant.  Under 
such circumstances, any justiciable controversy is extinguished.  Thus, the judgment 
debtor is forever deprived of his day in court on that cause of action without receiving 
any value in return for it. 
Id.  The court ruled that in this situation, the Texas execution statute arbitrarily and unreasonably 
interfered with the judgment debtor’s right to pursue the action and it was therefore unconstitutional 
as applied.  Id. at 307.  The Texas court did not explicitly consider the arguments the Utah Supreme 
Court articulated in Applied Medical regarding how transfers of choses in action indicate that a right 
of action is not an inalienable individual right and that changes of parties are possible, even 
common.  See id. at 304–07.  A further difference between the cases exists in that Criswell dealt with 
the turnover of plaintiff’s choses in action, while Applied Medical dealt with execution on them.  
Compare id. at 305, with Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 700. 
 190.  Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 703–04. 
 191.  Id.  The court noted that lawyers are officers of the court who have an advantage over their 
clients based on their knowledge of the potential risks and rewards of litigation and their knowledge 
of confidential information about their clients.  Id. at 703.  Therefore, lawyers are in a position to 
take advantage of the client if they are allowed to purchase a legal malpractice claim against 
themselves then move to dismiss those claims.  Id.  The court argued that this sort of behavior would 
undermine public confidence in the system, and the court had “a constitutional duty to regulate and 
supervise the actions of attorneys in the practice of law.”  Id. at 704.  Therefore, the exception as 
applied to attorneys was proper.  Id. 
 192.  Id.  The Utah courts have not issued a reported ruling on the issue since Applied Medical; 
however, there are three recent decisions from that state’s courts showing its continuing commitment 
to Applied Medical’s principles.  The first, Cosby v. Cazares, is an unreported opinion in a probate 
case in which the Court of Appeals of Utah upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment that 
transferred the defendant’s claim against the estate of one of plaintiff’s relatives that was the subject 
of the probate judgment.  No. 20091035-CA, 2010 WL 3795133, at *1–2 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 30, 
2010) (per curiam), cert denied, 247 P.3d 774 (Utah 2011).  In the second case, Golden Meadows 
Properties, LC v. Strand, the Court of Appeals of Utah reiterated that a judgment creditor may 
execute on choses in action against itself under Utah law but declined to entertain the judgment 
debtor’s arguments to the contrary because it decided the appeal on the merits, mooting the issue for 
that case.  241 P.3d 371, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 2010), cert denied, 247 P.3d 774 (Utah 2011).  Finally, 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah in Innnerlight, Inc. v. The Matrix Group, LLC, allowed a 
judgment creditor to execute on a judgment debtor’s appeal in 2007, holding that such an execution 
did not violate the judgment debtor’s constitutional right to an appeal under the Utah Constitution.  
No. 060400775, 2007 WL 7210447, at *2, *3 (4th Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah Sept. 19, 2007).  See supra 
notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
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Tenth Circuit considered whether under Utah law a judgment creditor could 
execute on the judgment debtor’s appeal to satisfy a supplemental judgment 
for attorney’s fees based on the same judgment from which the appeal was 
taken.193  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants, the judgment creditors, and plaintiff appealed the judgment on 
the merits.194  Defendants requested, and were granted, a supplemental 
judgment for attorney’s fees against plaintiff, which plaintiff did not 
appeal.195  Defendants then obtained a writ of execution against plaintiff’s 
underlying cause of action and plaintiff’s right to appeal from the judgment 
on the merits.196  Plaintiff objected, filing a motion to stay or quash the writ 
of execution.197  The district court denied the motion, and plaintiff once 
again failed to appeal from that adverse ruling.198  Defendants purchased the 
appeal and cause of action for $10,000 at the execution sale, and then moved 
to dismiss the merits appeal pending before the court of appeals.199  Only 
then did the plaintiff contest the writ.200 
The court of appeals concluded that the execution sale was valid 
because plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the appeal as a result of the 
sale.201  The court “recognize[d that] the circumstances of this case 
present[ed] a degree of discomfort” because if the judgment on the merits 
was reversed, the judgment for attorney’s fees would fall as well.202  
Nevertheless, the court refused to consider the plaintiff’s arguments against 
the sale’s lawfulness “[b]ecause [the p]laintiff did not appeal the district 
court’s decision allowing the execution sale to proceed.”203 
 
 193.  576 F.3d 1070, 1071 (10th Cir. 2009).  The court considered whether choses in action were 
subject to execution under Utah law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1), which 
mandates that federal courts apply the execution procedure of the state in which the district court 
sits.  Id. at 1074.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 194.  RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1072.  Plaintiff’s claims were for breach of contract and 
misrepresentation, arising out of defendant’s failure to implement a reduction in interest rate in 
accordance with a mortgage agreement between the parties.  Id. at 1071–72. 
 195.  Id. at 1072. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id.  It turned out to be significant that although “[p]laintiff raised various jurisdictional and 
due process arguments before the district court,” plaintiff “never alleged an inability to pay the 
judgment of attorneys’ fees or post a supersedeas bond.”  Id. at 1072, 1076; see also id. at 1077 
(Lucero, J., concurring). 
 198.  Id. at 1072 (majority opinion). 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 1072–73. 
 201.  Id. at 1075. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. at 1076.  The court cited authority for the proposition that a writ of execution is not 
subject to collateral attack.  Id. (citing Edmonston v. Sisk, 156 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1946)).  The 
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The majority opinion of RMA Ventures adds nothing to the development 
of Utah law, as the court was required to faithfully apply Utah’s law to the 
case before it.204  However, Judge Carlos Lucero’s concurring opinion 
leveled pointed criticism at the Utah approach.205  He began: “It is with 
considerable understatement that the majority acknowledges the ‘degree of 
discomfort’ presented by this case.  While I am constrained to agree that we 
must dismiss, I am troubled by the manner in which SunAmerica has 
extinguished RMA’s right to a merits appeal.”206  In part, Judge Lucero was 
concerned with the same thing as the majority; namely, that the judgment 
creditor executed on the appeal to satisfy a supplemental judgment entirely 
dependent on the validity of the merits judgment from which the appeal was 
taken.207  He also raised a second concern: 
As a matter of public policy, I doubt the wisdom of a rule that 
readily places the right to appeal on an auction block.  More 
troublesome still is a rule permitting a defendant to purchase its 
opponent’s appellate rights, thereby extinguishing a plaintiff’s 
claim. . . .  Today’s decision thus incentivizes Utah defendants to 
attempt an end run around merits determinations by purchasing a 
plaintiff’s right to appeal.  This incentive is at its zenith when it is 
most offensive—in those cases in which a defendant believes it 
would likely lose the merits appeal.208 
Judge Lucero noted that allowing execution on an appeal to satisfy the same 
judgment under review is even more disconcerting than allowing execution 
on a chose in action to satisfy a judgment in an unrelated action.209  
However, he ultimately agreed with the majority that the sale was valid 
because Utah law allows judgment creditors to execute on causes of action 
 
court continued, noting that the “[p]laintiff had numerous opportunities to avoid this outcome.”  Id.  
The plaintiff could have (1) appealed the award for attorney’s fees, (2) paid the judgment, or (3) 
filed a supersedeas bond, which it never argued it was unable to pay.  Id.  This illustrates the 
importance of challenging a writ of execution at the proper time and using the proper procedure.  
That being said, in Paglia v. Breskovich, a Washington court faced the same dilemma—the plaintiff 
had not properly attacked the writ of execution—and the court still vacated the writ of execution.  
522 P.2d 511, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 204.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1). 
 205.  RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076–77 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 206.  Id. at 1076. 
 207.  Id. at 1076–77.  His subsequent articulation demonstrates the circularity of this situation 
well: “We cannot reach the merits of this appeal if we grant the motion to dismiss, but we cannot 
know whether the motion to dismiss is well-taken unless we reach the merits.”  Id. at 1077. 
 208.  Id.  Judge Lucero also made the value argument, discussed supra note 176.  He argued that 
“the actual value of a claim purchased by an opponent at auction will never be fairly determined.”  
Id.  The claim executed on was for $950,000, and the judgment creditor paid a mere $10,000.  Id. 
 209.  Id. 
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against themselves, and plaintiff failed to take steps that would have stayed 
the execution sale.210 
In sum, Utah’s bright-line rule allows a defendant to obtain a writ of 
execution on choses in action against itself and to purchase those choses in 
action at an execution sale.211  There is only one small exception: public 
policy forbids an attorney or law firm from purchasing the legal malpractice 
claims of a former client against itself.212  Apart from this extremely narrow 
exception, choses in action are “fair game.” 
IV. THE SUPERIORITY OF WASHINGTON’S DISCRETIONARY APPROACH 
OVER UTAH’S BRIGHT-LINE RULE, THE INTERESTS AT STAKE,                      
AND THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A.  Bright-Line Rules Versus Sound Discretion 
The question is: which approach, Washington’s or Utah’s, is better?  As 
the foregoing Part suggests, the law surrounding whether a judgment 
creditor can execute on choses in action against itself is still fairly 
undeveloped.  Courts’ reasons for allowing or not allowing a defendant 
judgment creditor to execute on claims against itself vary widely or, worse, 
remain unarticulated.213  The primary reason for this is probably because 
there are very few examples of cases in which judgment creditors actually 
attempt to execute on choses in action against themselves.214   
What is clear is that the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor, and 
society as a whole have legitimate interests at stake, and that the strength of 
those interests relative to one another varies based on the facts and 
 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 704 (Utah 2002). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  The best example of this is the Nevada Supreme Court, which has issued only two very 
succinct, unpublished opinions on the issue.  Brandstetter v. Boyd, No. 54229, 2010 WL 4684450, at 
*1 (Nev. Nov. 12, 2010); Crenshaw v. Conrad, No. 49746, 2008 WL 6102109, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 12, 
2008).  This failure could be a result of the judicial discomfort the tactic engenders.  See, e.g., RMA 
Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076–77 (Lucero, J., concurring) (“It is with considerable understatement that 
the majority acknowledges the ‘degree of discomfort’ presented by this case.”); Tax Track Sys. 
Corp. v. New Investor World, Inc., No. 01 C 6217, 2006 WL 1648491, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2006) 
(“This court will not . . . reach such an absurd result.”).  It is possible that the level of judicial 
discomfort the tactic engenders is the reason there are so many unreported opinions—the courts may 
be reluctant to create binding precedent and thus condone the practice. 
 214.  Again, there are only about twenty-five cases that involve a judgment creditor attempting to 
obtain both sides of a lawsuit through enforcement of a judgment.  See supra note 129 and 
accompanying text. 
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circumstances of each case.215  This is the primary reason Washington’s 
discretionary approach, which vests a trial court with the ability to allow a 
writ to issue or to refuse based on the facts and circumstances of each case, 
is preferable to a bright-line rule such as Utah’s.216  A bright-line rule, 
regardless of which party it favors, would undervalue the interests of the 
party it disfavors. 
For example, a bright-line rule allowing the tactic has several potential 
negative effects.  First, a policy allowing the tactic in all circumstances 
“would result in the extinction of every [claim] . . . by an impecunious 
judgment debtor,” who cannot afford to pay a judgment or post bond to 
obtain a stay.217  This is because the judgment creditor can obtain the 
judgment debtor’s claim for a relatively small price, and the debtor will still 
be liable for the deficiency judgment.218  Second, such a rule would give a 
malicious judgment creditor a free hand to engage in tortious conduct toward 
a poor judgment debtor, or to harass the judgment debtor with impunity.219  
Thus, such a rule confers a right on the judgment creditor far beyond the 
mere right to collect a judgment; it confers a form of immunity from suit, 
and thus, goes beyond the intended purpose of a writ of execution.220  
Moreover, because the judgment is transferrable, it could be passed along to 
other defendants, effectively denying the judgment debtor all access to the 
courts.221  Such a construction of the law is unacceptable. 
 
 215.  RMA Ventures illustrates these interests well.  576 F.3d at 1076.  The court was 
uncomfortable with the fact that the judgment creditor could extinguish an appeal to satisfy a 
judgment wholly dependent on the outcome of that appeal, indicating a concern for the judgment 
debtor’s interests.  See id.  However, the judgment creditor also had an interest in collecting his 
judgment, and in this particular case, the judgment debtor failed to take advantage of the many 
opportunities for relief at his disposal.  Id.  These examples also demonstrate society’s interest in a 
legal system that delivers just and final results in the most efficient manner possible.  See id.  This, 
after all, was the goal the court, in its careful consideration of these interests, was trying to achieve.  
Id. 
 216.  See Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 217.  Tax Track, 2006 WL 1648491, at *1.  One might speculate that the only reason this has not 
yet happened in states like Utah is simply because not many defense attorneys are aware of it. 
 218.  See Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1999). 
 219.  For example, under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2006), “[a] debt collector may not engage in any 
conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection 
with the collection of a debt.”  However, if the debt collector were to obtain a judgment against the 
debtor in default, he would be free to engage in such conduct because if the debtor sued, he could 
obtain a writ of execution against the claims and extinguish them.  Cf. Sohns v. Bramacint, LLC, No. 
09-1225 (JNE/FLN), 2010 WL 3926264 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2010) (holding that a debt collector was 
liable under § 1692d when the debt collector used a tactic called “caller ID spoofing” to make it 
appear a collection call was actually from the debtor’s mother-in-law, then made veiled threats to 
take away the debtor’s child).  A debt collector using the tactic described in this Comment would 
thus be shielded from liability. 
 220.  See Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514. 
 221.  Cf. id. at 512.  In Paglia, the judgment creditor purchased the judgment against the judgment 
debtor from a third party.  Id.  Although the Paglia court reversed the trial court’s decision to issue a 
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A bright-line rule barring judgment creditors from executing on claims 
against themselves is not much better.  In the case of a judgment debtor with 
few assets, the claim may be the only thing of value available to the 
judgment creditor.222  If he is barred from executing on the claim, not only 
does he lose the value derived from its sale, but he also is forced to defend 
against the claim, potentially at great cost.223  If the judgment creditor is 
successful in his defense, the debtor will have exhausted the claim, and there 
will be no value for the judgment creditor to recover to satisfy his 
judgment.224  This result is particularly egregious if the judgment debtor’s 
claim is frivolous or unlikely to succeed on the merits. 
Therefore, instead of laying down a bright-line rule, courts should adopt 
a more flexible approach akin to Washington’s and allow a trial court to 
issue or refuse to issue a writ based on the facts and circumstances of each 
case.225  One might argue that a bright-line rule would save the court time 
and resources, is less costly to the litigants, provides certainty, and ensures 
uniformity of outcomes.226  These are all valid points.  However, courts 
engage in the sort of fact sensitive analysis required by a balancing test quite 
often (for instance, in the context of preliminary injunctions).227  Also, in 
light of the small number of cases in which a judgment creditor actually 
attempts to execute on choses in action against itself, the increase in cost and 
burden on the courts will be minimal.228  Thus, a balancing test similar to 
Washington’s approach is preferable to a bright-line rule because it can 
accommodate for the interests of all parties while imposing only a minimal 
burden on the court and the litigants. 
With that in mind, the way forward becomes clear.  First, one must 
examine the interests that courts consider, whether explicitly stated or 
merely hinted at, in deciding the propriety of the tactic.  Then, based on the 
results of this inquiry, one can formulate a test that courts can apply when 
confronted with the tactic that properly balances those interests. 
 
writ of execution, in a jurisdiction that has a bright-line rule allowing execution on choses in action, 
such a practice would be acceptable and might even become common.  Id. at 514. 
 222.  See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, 512 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 1994). 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  See Paglia, 522 P.2d at 513. 
 226.  See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 447 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that 
the FCC considered these factors while developing its regulatory framework). 
 227.  See, e.g., Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 228.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Interests at Stake when a Judgment Creditor Executes on Choses in 
Action Against Itself 
There are three interested parties when a judgment creditor attempts to 
satisfy a judgment by executing on a judgment debtor’s choses in action 
against the judgment creditor: the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor, 
and society in terms of its interest in an efficient court system “that is just in 
both appearance and fact.”229 
1. The Judgment Debtor’s Interests 
Courts have considered several interests of the judgment debtor when 
deciding whether a judgment creditor can obtain choses in action against 
itself through a writ of execution.  First and foremost, a judgment debtor in 
his capacity as plaintiff has an interest in having his claims heard on the 
merits by an impartial tribunal, a right which may even be guaranteed by a 
state constitution’s open courts clause.230  Second, a policy allowing 
judgment creditors to execute on claims against themselves incentivizes 
defendants to try to avoid litigation on the merits by using the tactic, and 
opens the door to abusive practices.231  Third, the burden of a policy 
allowing these transactions also falls most heavily on indigent judgment 
debtors.232  Finally, allowing a judgment creditor to execute on choses in 
action against itself is inequitable because the value of the plaintiff’s claim 
will never be fairly determined—a rationale few courts have relied on, but 
one that deserves more credit than it has so far been given.233 
The most important interest of the judgment debtor is his interest in 
having his claims heard by an impartial tribunal on the merits.  This interest 
is hinted at in Paglia v. Breskovich when the court references the “grossly 
inequitable result” of vesting ownership of both sides of a lawsuit in one 
party.234  The court in MP Medical Inc. v. Wegman explained that such a 
result is “‘grossly inequitable’ because the judgment debtor would be 
deprived of the opportunity to establish his claim.”235  In other words, if the 
judgment creditor is allowed to obtain both sides of the lawsuit, the claim 
 
 229.  Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1999). 
 230.  See Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 231.  See RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1076–77 (10th Cir. 
2009) (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 232.  See, e.g., Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (Pearson, J., 
concurring) (noting that the tactic “borders on abuse of legal process” when a defendant’s attorney 
purchases the plaintiff’s claims against his client for the sole purpose of destroying plaintiff’s right 
to maintain the suit). 
 233.  See Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 208, 212. 
 234.  522 P.2d at 514. 
 235.  213 P.3d 931, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
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will be extinguished.236  There are several reasons why allowing the 
extinguishment of a claim in this manner is undesirable, or perhaps even 
prohibited. 
First, the extinguishment of a claim, as opposed to its transfer, may 
violate the open courts clause of the forum state’s constitution.237  This 
largely depends on how the state’s courts have interpreted the state’s open 
courts clause.238  In Texas, for example, one court has held that the judicial 
turnover to a judgment creditor of claims against itself extinguishes any 
justiciable controversy, and therefore violates Texas’s open courts clause.239  
The court recognized that when one party obtains both sides of a lawsuit the 
controversy ceases to exist, as one party cannot litigate against itself.240 
 
 236.  Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. App. 1992).  Most cases in 
which the tactic is successfully used will be extinguished through defendant’s motion to dismiss.  
See, e.g., RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076.  However, the motion to dismiss may not be necessary to 
extinguish the claim because the case or controversy that rendered the claim justiciable has ceased to 
exist and the court could dismiss the case sua sponte.  If the claim were not extinguished, such 
actions would lead to the nonsensical situation of a court litigating a dispute in which a defendant 
defends itself against itself as plaintiff.  Such a scenario violates the Case or Controversy Clause of 
the United States Constitution (for cases in federal courts), and the justiciability requirements of 
state constitutions (for those in state courts).  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Hoffert v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[W]here both litigants desire the same result, 
there can be no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.”). 
 237.  See Criswell, 843 S.W.2d at 307.  Appeals, on the other hand, are generally not protected by 
state constitutions.  MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936 (“MP Medical has no constitutional right to appeal in 
this case.”); see supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.  Although one notable exception is 
Utah, which guarantees a civil appeal of right from any judgment entered in its courts.  UTAH 
CONST. art. VIII, § 5.  At least one Utah court has interpreted this clause in the same manner as the 
state’s open courts clause and has held that execution upon the appeal by a judgment creditor that the 
appeal is against does not violate the judgment debtor’s constitutional right to an appeal.  
Innnerlight, Inc. v. The Matrix Grp., LLC, No. 060400775, 2007 WL 7210447, at *3 (4th Jud. Dist. 
Ct. Utah Sept. 19, 2007). 
  Because appeals generally are not constitutionally protected, execution upon an appeal to 
satisfy a truly final judgment in a different action (i.e., one from which no appeal was taken) would 
be more proper than execution upon an appeal to satisfy a judgment from which the appeal was 
taken.  The concern, discussed in RMA Ventures, is that to determine whether the writ of execution, 
acquisition by the opponent, substitution of the parties, and dismissal of the claims were proper, one 
must consider the merits of the appeal; but one cannot consider the merits if a motion to dismiss is 
granted.  576 F.3d at 1076; see also MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936.  However, it follows that in the 
situation of execution upon a chose in action at the appellate stage to satisfy a judgment that has 
been appealed, no constitutional considerations arise absent a clause similar to Utah’s but interpreted 
more favorably to the holder of the right of appeal.  However, it does not appear that courts have 
ever faced this situation. 
 238.  Compare Criswell, 843 S.W.2d at 306–07, with Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 
699, 702–03 (Utah 2002). 
 239.  Criswell, 843 S.W.2d at 306. 
 240.  Id. 
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In contrast, the Supreme Court of Utah has held that such a scenario 
does not violate its open courts clause because the right of access to the 
courts transfers with the claim.241  Initially, in Tanasse, the Supreme Court 
of Utah identified this point as one of the reasons for its holding that a law 
firm’s acquisition of legal malpractice claims against itself violates public 
policy.242  The court limited its holding to the acquisition of legal 
malpractice claims by the defendant lawyers, but it also recognized that this 
argument applies to other claims and other parties.243 
In Applied Medical Technologies v. Eames, however, the Utah Supreme 
Court reasoned around this argument, noting that because choses in action 
are regularly transferred, the right guaranteed by the open courts clause is 
not a personal one, but one attached to the chose in action itself.244  
However, this argument ignores the fact that under ordinary circumstances, 
the chose in action is transferred to a third party with an equal interest in 
pressing the litigation to its maximum potential.245  In other words, the party 
receiving the plaintiff’s interest in the suit has the same incentive to recover 
as much as possible from the defendant, and the justiciability of the claim is 
not destroyed.246  If the claim’s justiciability is destroyed, as necessarily 
happens when the defendant acquires it, then it follows that the 
corresponding right to a hearing on the merits must also be destroyed, and 
the mere act of purchase by the defendant destroys it.247  However, the 
Applied Medical court raises a valid point, and a state’s supreme court is 
entitled to interpret its constitution in the manner it believes is most 
correct.248  Still, there are other reasons that public policy favors a full 
hearing on the merits. 
The second reason that a policy favoring a full hearing on the merits is 
desirable is that it reduces the incentive for defendants to avoid litigation by 
extinguishing plaintiffs’ claims using a writ of execution.249  As Judge 
Lucero noted in his concurring opinion in RMA Ventures, “This incentive is 
 
 241.  Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 702–03. 
 242.  Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1999). 
 243.  Id. at 212. 
 244.  Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 702–03. 
 245.  Cf. Associated Ready Mix, Inc., v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. App. 1992) (making 
a similar argument in a turnover context). 
 246.  See id.  Courts also consider whether a party has the same incentive to litigate in the context 
of whether to apply offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel to prevent duplicative litigation of an 
issue.  See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331–32 (1979). 
 247.  See Hoffert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 248.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 9 (1995) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and 
unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.” (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 
U.S. 551, 557 (1940))). 
 249.  Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J.) 
(“[W]e note that a judgment creditor is most highly motivated to utilize the procedure employed 
below when the claims against it are meritorious—a troubling incentive structure.”). 
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at its zenith when it is most offensive—in those cases in which a defendant 
believes it would likely lose the [on the] merits . . . .”250  Judge Pearson’s 
hypothetical from his concurring opinion in Paglia illustrates this dilemma: 
[L]et us suppose that the cause of action levied upon is a personal 
injury action in which the injured plaintiff, because of severe 
injuries, suffers great economic hardship while his lawsuit is 
pending.  Let us suppose further that counsel for the defendant 
acquires by assignment a judgment debt for medical expenses 
incurred by the plaintiff as a result of his injuries.  Should the law 
permit counsel for [the] defendant to destroy plaintiff’s cause of 
action by becoming the owner of it?  To ask the question is to 
answer it.  The law should never be interpreted so as to subvert 
justice.251 
A judgment creditor in the position of the one in Judge Pearson’s 
hypothetical will naturally want to avoid litigating a meritorious claim, for 
he will likely lose and face substantial liability.252  In fact, such 
considerations are often the main factor motivating a judgment creditor to 
execute upon a judgment debtor’s cause of action against the judgment 
creditor.253  When the judgment creditor is brazen enough to admit his true 
motivation, courts have not responded favorably.254  Execution is meant to 
provide a means for a judgment creditor to collect money to satisfy a 
judgment, not to provide a shield against liability.255  Essentially, the courts 
 
 250.  RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(Lucero, J., concurring). 
 251.  Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).  The fact that Judge 
Pearson referred to counsel for the defendant and not the defendant is irrelevant—because counsel 
was acting in his client’s interest, it does not alter this Comment’s analysis.  See id. 
 252.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1077 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 253.  See, e.g., Paglia, 522 P.2d at 512. 
 254.  MP Med. Inc. v. Redman, 213 P.3d 931, 933 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (“Because the trial 
court was aware that respondents sought to dismiss MP Medical’s case by purchasing its appeal, we 
hold that the trial court should have exercised its inherent supervisory authority over its own process 
to [prevent that result].”); Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514–15; see also Commerce Sav. Ass’n v. Welch, 783 
S.W.2d 668, 668–69 (Tex. App. 1989) (“[Judgment creditor] attempted a novel strategy which, if 
successful, would allow it to extinguish a cause of action against it by a plaintiff who happens to be a 
judgment debtor in an unrelated action.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment invalidating the 
strategy.”). 
 255.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514. 
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are reacting negatively to a misuse of the execution statutes that “would 
outrage the right of a judgment debtor if allowed to stand.”256 
Third, the burdens of such a policy rest most heavily on indigent 
judgment debtors who cannot afford to pay the judgment or, in the case of an 
appeal, to post a supersedeas bond.257  Judge Pearson’s hypothetical 
illustrates this point as well.258  A plaintiff who is injured by the misconduct 
of a defendant and cannot afford to pay his medical bills, as in the example, 
is precisely the type of person who needs the aid and protection of the law 
most.259  Further, if the practice of executing upon choses in action against 
oneself becomes more commonplace, such a policy “would result in the 
extinction of every [cause of action or] appeal from an adverse judgment by 
an impecunious judgment debtor.”260 
A judgment debtor also has an interest in maximizing the value of his or 
her claims, and that value “will never fairly be determined” at an execution 
sale.261  The Utah Supreme Court recognized a judgment debtor’s interest in 
receiving the full value of his claims in Tanasse, and partly relied on this 
rationale in holding that an attorney or law firm could not execute on legal 
malpractice claims against itself.262  In other cases, judges have made this 
argument in concurring opinions.263  Also, in cases involving the direct 
turnover or assignment to a judgment creditor of a chose in action against 
itself, this rationale has been relied on.264  Yet, in the context of a judgment 
creditor executing on and purchasing a cause of action against itself, more 
 
 256.  Id. (quoting Triplett v. Bergman, 144 P. 899, 900 (Wash. 1914)).  One might label this a 
species of “good faith” analysis.  The question would be whether the judgment creditor actually 
sought to satisfy the judgment by the levy and sale of the judgment debtor’s claims against him, or 
whether the judgment creditor merely hoped to avoid being hauled into court to defend against those 
claims. 
 257.  But see infra notes 308–11 and accompanying text (discussing how a judgment debtor’s 
indigence may affect a judgment creditor’s interests). 
 258.  See Paglia, 522 P.2d at 515. 
 259.  O’Connor v. Matzdorff, 458 P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. 1969) (“The right of the poor to obtain 
redress for wrongs, and to defend themselves when sued by the more affluent, is presently of 
nationwide concern . . . .”). 
 260.  Tax Track Sys. Corp. v. New Investor World, Inc., No. 01 C 6217, 2006 WL 1648491, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. June 9, 2006). 
 261.  RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(Lucero, J., concurring).  But see Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762, 766–67 
(10th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J.) (arguing that an execution sale provides at least minimal safeguards for 
the judgment debtor, as opposed to the outright transfer of choses in action from the judgment debtor 
to the judgment creditor). 
 262.  Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 210–11 (Utah 1999). 
 263.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1077 (Lucero, J., concurring); Paglia, 522 P.2d at 515 
(Pearson, C.J., concurring). 
 264.  Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 762, 766–77; Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 
843 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. App. 1992); Commerce Sav. Ass’n v. Welch, 783 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. 
App. 1989). 
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majority opinions have rejected the argument than have been persuaded by 
it.265 
Courts have rejected this argument because an execution sale provides a 
“key safeguard” in the form of a public sale.266  The argument in favor of 
this view is that the value of the chose in action for the purposes of 
execution is established by the execution sale itself.267  Moreover, the sale is 
open to the public; a judgment debtor may appear and bid on his claims 
alongside the judgment creditor and the world at large.268 
These arguments ignore two factors that set unliquidated choses in 
action apart from other forms of property.  First, because of the level of 
difficulty inherent in any estimation of value for a chose in action,269 and the 
lack of a market for unliquidated claims,270 a judgment debtor is unlikely to 
receive a fair price for his claims.271  In fact, “in many instances the 
judgment creditor will be the sole bidder at [execution] sales, just as 
mortgagees frequently submit lone bids at foreclosure auctions,” and will 
 
 265.  Compare Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 1010 
(Miss. 2006) (rejecting argument), and Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 702–03 
(Utah 2002) (same), with Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 210–11 (relying, in part, on the value argument). 
 266.  Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 767; see Citizens Nat’l, 935 So. 2d at 1014. 
 267.  Citizens Nat’l, 935 So. 2d at 1004, 1011.  The court noted that the subjective view of a 
litigant as to the value of the chose in action is irrelevant, and no “valuation by trial” is necessary.  
Id. at 1010–11. 
 268.  Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 767; see also RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1072 n.4. 
 269.  Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 766 (“We base our conclusion in large part on the 
extraordinary difficulty in estimating the value of a chose in action.”). 
 270.  See Marcushamer, supra note 21, at 1572–73, 1598 (advocating the development of a 
market for unliquidated tort claims). 
 271.  Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1999); see also RMA 
Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1077 (Lucero, J., concurring) (noting that the value of such choses in action 
“will never be fairly determined” at an execution sale).  This concern was the reason that the 
California legislature amended its execution statute in 1941 to exempt pending choses in action from 
execution and allow a judgment creditor to reach them through a lien.  Denham v. Farmers Ins. Co., 
213 Cal. App. 3d 1061, 1071 (1989) (“In 1941, the California Legislature amended Code of Civil 
Procedure section 688 to prohibit execution upon a cause of action due to the danger that a sale of 
the action would realize far less than it was worth.”); Abatti v. Eldridge, 103 Cal. App. 3d 484, 486–
87 (1980) (“The purpose of the 1941 amendment was to eliminate the danger that the plaintiff-
judgment debtor would be deprived of his cause of action at a figure far below its actual worth, and 
thereby have less of his judgment debt satisfied than proper.”); Symposium, The Work of the 1941 
Legislature, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1941) (“Since experience has demonstrated that a cause of 
action upon which an action is pending does not bring very much on execution sale [footnote 
omitted] the remedy now provided for by Section 688.1 is a more just and reasonable one.  It 
protects the judgment creditor and gives him adequate relief and at the same time does not produce 
unfair hardship insofar as the judgment debtor is concerned.”). 
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therefore name his own price.272  Thus, this “key safeguard” provides little 
practical protection, because if the judgment debtor could afford to outbid 
the judgment creditor at the sale, he probably could afford to pay the 
judgment or post a sufficient bond to obtain a stay.273  Second, there is a 
significant danger of windfall in favor of the judgment creditor through his 
avoidance of a potentially substantial judgment for a fraction of the cost.274 
Thus, a bright-line rule allowing a judgment creditor to execute against 
choses in action against himself does violence to several interests of the 
judgment debtor.  It denies the judgment debtor a chance to establish his 
claim on the merits and potentially violates his right of access to the courts.  
It sanctions the use of a writ of execution as a means of avoiding litigation, 
and this incentive only intensifies with the strength of the plaintiff’s claim, 
leaving the judgment debtor open to abuse.  The result of this policy is that a 
judgment creditor faced with a lawsuit filed by an indigent judgment debtor 
needs only to obtain a judgment against the judgment debtor to escape 
liability.275  Finally, it deprives the judgment debtor of a claim of potentially 
substantial value and provides a windfall to the judgment creditor.  Thus, the 
judgment debtor stands to suffer substantial harm if his judgment creditor is 
allowed to execute upon and purchase claims against itself.276  A 
 
 272.  Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 767; Marantha Faith Ctr., Inc. v. Colonial Trust Co., 
904 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (Miss. 2004). 
 273.  See, e.g., Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 512 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).  In Paglia, the 
plaintiff judgment debtor raised enough money to satisfy one judgment, and thus forestalled 
execution on his choses in action.  Id.  But when the judgment creditor purchased a second 
outstanding judgment and obtained a second writ of execution, plaintiff had no further resources to 
draw from, and the sale went forward.  Id.  Of course, if the judgment debtor does have sufficient 
assets, this changes the analysis.  See infra notes 305–07 and accompanying text. 
 274.  Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 212.  In Tanasse, the court noted that “[t]here may be a significant 
motivation for the lawyer to ‘buy out’ the malpractice claim for a nominal amount (or at least for an 
amount the lawyer designates), leaving a deficiency judgment owing, while the client loses the 
opportunity to litigate.”  Id.  However, the court continued: “Although such a practice may be 
acceptable in cases not involving legal malpractice claims,” the potential for damage to the public 
trust in the legal profession was too great of a risk to allow lawyers to execute on such claims.  Id.; 
see also Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 767–68. 
 275.  One particularly egregious example of this would be a variation of the facts of Citizens 
National Bank v. Dixieland Forest Products, LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 1006–07 (Miss. 2006).  In that 
case, the judgment debtor sued the defendant bank, who counterclaimed on a debt owed by the 
plaintiff.  Id.  The bank succeeded in its counterclaims and executed on the judgment debtor’s 
original claims against itself to satisfy the judgment.  Id. at 1007–08.  Apparently, the plaintiffs in 
this case were well-to-do.  See id. at 1006.  However, if one considers such a fact pattern in the 
context of, for example, a Truth in Lending Act claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006) filed by an 
indigent plaintiff behind on her bills (perhaps as a result of the lender’s misrepresentations), one can 
see how it would grant near immunity for a lender.  See, e.g., Plant v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc. of Ga., 
598 F.2d 1357, 1359 (5th Cir. 1979).  When sued, all the lender would have to do is counterclaim on 
any unpaid debt, move for summary judgment, and execute on the plaintiff’s claims, thereby 
escaping all liability on the plaintiff’s claims.  See id. 
 276.  It may be that the judgment debtor will suffer some of these consequences even if a third 
party purchases the claims against the creditor.  However, such a situation is less egregious than if a 
judgment creditor purchases claims against itself because a third party will actually litigate the 
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discretionary approach like Washington’s will allow courts to accommodate 
these interests in deciding whether a writ of execution should issue; 
however, Washington’s approach fails to provide the court with a clear sense 
of when it should refuse to issue the writ of execution, and further guidance 
on the factors courts should consider would be helpful.277 
2. The Judgment Creditor’s Interests 
Balanced against the interests of the judgment debtor are the interests of 
the judgment creditor, which can also be identified through an analysis of 
the cases described in the preceding Part.278  In descending order of 
importance, these interests include: protection of a right established through 
litigation that resulted in a conclusive, binding judgment in a court of law;279 
preservation of the assets of a judgment debtor for payment of the 
judgment;280 protection against unmeritorious claims filed in the hope of 
forcing a settlement;281 and preventing collateral attack of an execution 
sale.282 
The judgment creditor’s interest in protecting a right established through 
litigation is the most important interest.283  This consideration, even when it 
is not explicitly acknowledged, provides a backdrop for every decision that 
deals with the issue of whether a judgment creditor can execute on causes of 
action against himself.284  After all, the goal of execution is to provide a 
 
claim.  See Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. App. 1992).  Thus, 
in some sense, the harm to the judgment debtor’s interests is heightened by the fundamental injustice 
of allowing a judgment creditor to avoid liability for injury that he caused. 
 277.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 513 (holding that a trial court should exercise its supervisory powers to 
prevent an inequitable result if “exercisable when the demands of justice to all parties can be 
reasonably satisfied”). 
 278.  See supra Part III. 
 279.  See McVeigh v. Lerner, 849 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. App. 1993). 
 280.  See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, 512 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 1994). 
 281.  See Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 213 (Utah 1999) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that disallowing the tactic would give judgment 
debtors “additional and unjustified leverage . . . in trying to settle such a suit for more than it is 
objectively worth”). 
 282.  See RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 283.  McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 915 (“The purpose of execution of a judgment is . . . to transfer that 
property to the hands of the prevailing party—where, by virtue of the judgment itself, it has been 
decided through due process and course of law that the property belongs.”). 
 284.  This concern is most obvious in Johnson v. Dahlquist, 225 P. 817, 818 (Wash. 1924) 
(“[W]hy should not [a judgment debtor’s] assets, whatever their nature, be taken to satisfy a 
judgment?”). 
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means for a successful litigant to obtain satisfaction for injury—whether 
financial, physical, or emotional—at the hands of the judgment debtor.285 
Within this interest, there appear to be two mitigating factors that affect 
a court’s analysis: first, whether an appeal was taken from the judgment to 
be satisfied, and second, whether the judgment creditor was actually a party 
to the proceeding in which the judgment to be satisfied was entered.286  For 
the purposes of appeal, a judgment is final if it “ends the litigation on the 
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”287  
The same is technically true for execution.288  However, courts appear to 
recognize that there is a qualitative difference between a judgment from 
which no appeal is taken and a judgment which has been appealed, in that 
the former is conclusive while the latter may be reversed.289  When a 
judgment creditor executes on a judgment debtor’s cause of action and 
appeals against the judgment creditor to satisfy the same judgment from 
which the appeal was taken, the judgment creditor’s interest in enforcing the 
judgment appears to carry less force with the courts.290  Although there are 
no cases that deal with execution on a judgment debtor’s cause of action to 
satisfy a judgment in a separate action that is pending appellate review, 
presumably the concern would still exist in that situation.291  Therefore, 
 
 285.  See Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996) (“To protect and aid the collection of a 
federal judgment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide fast and effective mechanisms for 
execution.”); Cnty. Trust Co. v. Berg, 318 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (“The policy of the 
law is to assist rather than to make it more difficult for the judgment creditor.”). 
 286.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076; Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 512 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1974). 
 287.  Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
 288.  Katz v. N.M.E. Hosps., Inc., 842 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 289.  See, e.g., MP Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).  The court 
held that “allowing one party to destroy the opposing party’s appeal by becoming its owner through 
enforcement of the very judgment under review is fundamentally unjust.”  Id.  This fundamental 
injustice appears to arise from the fact that there is a chance the judgment on which the execution is 
based will be reversed.  Both the majority in RMA Ventures and Judge Lucero in his concurring 
opinion expressed this concern.  RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1075–76; id. at 1076 (Lucero, J., 
concurring).  Similarly, some courts have even held that an appealed judgment is void for res 
judicata purposes, though these courts are in the minority.  YEAZELL, supra note 109, at 688.  Some 
legislatures have also recognized this fundamental difference.  See supra note 57. 
 290.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1077 (“[I]n the typical situation—to the extent any such 
transaction may be termed ‘typical’—a judgment creditor executes upon a final judgment in one case 
to purchase a chose in action in a separate and distinct case.  By contrast, SunAmerica purchased the 
right to appeal in the same case that produced the judgment upon which it executed.  Thus this 
appeal’s circularity: We cannot reach the merits of this appeal if we grant the motion to dismiss, but 
we cannot know whether the motion to dismiss is well-taken unless we reach the merits.”). 
 291.  A supplemental judgment, like the one for attorney’s fees in RMA Ventures, is technically a 
separate judgment.  Id. at 1073.  However, a judgment for attorney’s fees is granted in the same 
action as and stands or falls with a judgment on the merits.  Id. at 1075.  Amphibious Partners LLC 
v. Redman comes much closer, in that the judgment creditor sought assignment of the judgment 
debtor’s pending case in another jurisdiction, and the trial court granted the motion.  389 F. App’x 
762, 762 (10th Cir. 2010).  The judgment debtor appealed the trial court’s grant of the motion, and 
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when the judgment to be enforced is actually final, i.e., not pending 
appellate review, a court is more likely to allow the judgment creditor to 
execute on the choses in action of a judgment debtor.292  If a judgment has 
been appealed, it does not destroy the judgment creditor’s interest in or 
ability to enforce the judgment, but it does lessen its impact.293 
Courts are also influenced by whether the judgment creditor was a party 
to the proceeding in which the judgment was entered or merely purchased an 
unsatisfied judgment from a third party.294  In cases where a judgment 
creditor obtained the judgment as a party to prior litigation, the courts are 
more likely to allow a writ of execution to issue.295  A likely reason for this 
is because the judgment creditor is trying to vindicate some wrong done to 
him, personally, by the judgment debtor.296  In contrast, when a judgment 
creditor obtains a judgment against a judgment debtor from a third party for 
the sole purpose of destroying the judgment debtor’s unrelated claims 
against the judgment creditor, courts have not been sympathetic.297  
Obtaining a judgment for the sole purpose of avoiding litigation is little 
more than an attempt to avoid liability and not an attempt to right a wrong 
 
the judgment creditor moved to substitute itself while the appeal was pending.  Id. at 763.  However, 
this case is not quite on point for two reasons.  First, it involved assignment of the claims, and not 
levy and execution.  Id.  Second, the appeal was taken from the trial court’s order assigning the 
claim, and the debtor had already appealed the judgment on the merits and lost.  Id.  The specific 
issue for which there appears to be no precedent is how courts view execution on a chose in action to 
satisfy a judgment on the merits in a separate action which has been appealed.  The best clue out 
there is that Judge Lucero, writing for the majority in Amphibious Partners, distinguished RMA 
Ventures on the grounds that it concerned “the seizure of the right to prosecute the very appeal at 
issue, not of a separate chose in action.”  Id. at 764.  Thus, it is probable that the courts will view 
execution upon a claim separate and distinct from the case at hand differently than execution on a 
claim to satisfy a judgment in the same case.  This Comment’s point, however, is that the same 
concerns apply, but to a lesser degree; namely, that the creditor is executing upon a cause of action 
to satisfy a judgment of dubious continuing validity. 
 292.  See Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 1014 (Miss. 
2006) (“Significantly, the plaintiffs never appealed the final judgment.” (emphasis added)). 
 293.  See MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936. 
 294.  See Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 512 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).  But see Citizens Nat’l, 
935 So. 2d at 1011 (“The bank correctly notes . . . it would make no difference if the bank had 
obtained its judgments in a separate court proceeding against the plaintiffs . . . [or] if the bank had 
bought the two judgments from [a] third party.” (second ellipsis and bracketed material in original)). 
 295.  Compare Applied Med. Techs. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 700, 704 (Utah 2002), with Paglia, 
522 P.2d at 514. 
 296.  See Citizens Nat’l, 935 So. 2d at 1007 (judgment debtor’s failure to make payments on a 
promissory note to judgment creditor); Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 700 (failure to make mortgage 
payments owed to defendant); Johnson v. Dahlquist, 225 P. 817, 817 (Wash. 1924) (award of costs 
on appeal). 
 297.  See Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514. 
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done to the judgment creditor personally.298  This is closely related to the 
skewed incentive structure Judge Lucero was concerned about in his 
majority opinion in Amphibious Partners299 and his concurring opinion in 
RMA Ventures.300  In short, it is “grossly inequitable” to allow a defendant to 
destroy claims against himself without regard to the merits by purchasing 
another person’s right to recover from the judgment debtor.301 
The second interest of the judgment creditor involved in cases where 
one attempts to execute upon an opponent’s cause of action is the judgment 
creditor’s interest in ensuring that the plaintiff has sufficient assets with 
which to satisfy the judgment.302  Surprisingly, this concern has not been the 
focus of much discussion by the courts that have faced the issue, even 
though the entire point of execution is to “transfer [the judgment debtor’s] 
property to the hands of the prevailing party.”303  In fact, of all the cases in 
which courts considered whether to allow the tactic, only the Iowa Supreme 
Court has relied on this argument.304 
One possibility is that the judgment debtor has sufficient assets apart 
from the choses in action against the judgment creditor to satisfy the 
judgment.305  A judgment debtor that has assets in excess of the amount of 
the judgment can conceivably pay the judgment or file a supersedeas 
undertaking to stay enforcement of that judgment pending appeal.306  It 
follows that if a valid writ of execution issues, it is only because the 
judgment debtor has either failed to pay the judgment or failed to post a 
supersedeas bond.307  In such a situation, the judgment creditor is more 
justified in executing upon a judgment debtor’s chose in action, because the 
 
 298.  See id. 
 299.  Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 300.  RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1076–77 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 301.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514. 
 302.  See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, 512 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 1994).  This is the 
underlying rationale for requiring a supersedeas undertaking to forestall enforcement of a judgment 
pending appeal.  See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
 303.  McVeigh v. Lerner, 849 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. App. 1993). 
 304.  Chrysler, 512 N.W.2d at 305. 
 305.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076 (“Plaintiff has never argued an inability to pay the 
judgment or post a bond.”). 
 306.  See Athridge v. Iglesias, 464 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2006).  In some jurisdictions, a 
supersedeas bond can consist of real property.  Id.  In RMA Ventures the judgment debtor’s apparent 
ability (or, more accurately, failure to argue its inability) to either pay the judgment or file a 
supersedeas undertaking was one of the deciding factors that both the majority and concurring 
opinions focused on in disposing of the case.  576 F.3d at 1076; id. at 1077 (Lucero, J., concurring).  
One potential concern is if the judgment creditor’s assets are tied up in real estate or tangible 
personal property that will have to be sold in order to raise the money to pay or stay the judgment.  
In such a situation, the equities may shift more toward the judgment debtor, making execution on his 
claims by the judgment creditor less appropriate. 
 307.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076. 
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debtor could have prevented the writ from issuing if he truly wanted to retain 
control of his chose in action. 
At the other extreme is a situation where the judgment debtor has few or 
no assets apart from the choses in action upon which the judgment creditor 
may execute.308  This was the scenario posited by Justice Zimmerman in 
Tanasse, in which he advocated allowing execution by an attorney on a 
former client’s legal malpractice claims against himself only if it was the last 
asset of the judgment debtor.309  This increases the gravity of the judgment 
creditor’s interest in executing on the choses in action immediately for two 
reasons.  First, there is no other property to which the judgment creditor can 
turn to satisfy the outstanding judgment.310  Second, if the judgment debtor 
is allowed to pursue the chose in action and loses on the merits, whatever 
value the chose in action has will be exhausted, leaving nothing at all for the 
judgment creditor.311 
If a judgment debtor is allowed to exhaust his right to pursue a cause of 
action that ultimately fails, not only is the judgment creditor left holding the 
proverbial bag for the original judgment, but it was also forced to defend 
against a claim, perhaps at great expense, that could have gone toward 
satisfaction of the judgment.312  Thus, in such a situation, the third interest of 
the judgment creditor—the interest in avoiding frivolous litigation—is 
implicated.  As one court noted, “[f]rivolous appeals or petitions should not 
 
 308.  See, e.g., Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 512 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that 
judgment debtor’s only asset was the claim upon which judgment creditor sought to execute). 
 309.  Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 213 (Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring and dissenting).  However, Justice Zimmerman also argued that if the claim was the 
last asset of the debtor, if the execution took place within one year of filing the claim, and if it was 
not for equivalent value, then the debtor could declare bankruptcy and avoid the execution.  Id.  In 
this way the claim would be preserved.  Id. 
 310.  See id. 
 311.  Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, 512 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 1994).  The Supreme 
Court of Iowa explained: 
Chrysler contends that, if the stay is granted, its rights will be prejudiced because it now 
has offers from some of the other defendants to contribute to the claim.  But, if the matter 
is allowed to proceed to trial, and a defense verdict is rendered, the federal claim would 
be valueless.  Chrysler would be left without any remedy to collect its state court 
judgment.  In addition, Chrysler argues that in a $10,000,000 lawsuit the costs would be 
considerable, and the plaintiff may not be able to prosecute it successfully. 
Id.  Similarly, if the plaintiff fails to appeal and the execution is completed before the statutory 
period expires, it may have some value left, but that value will be severely diminished.  Note, 
however, that if a judgment debtor is successful in his claim after execution upon it has been denied, 
the judgment creditor will be entitled to an offset.  Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 
S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. App. 1992).  Thus, this concern is only implicated if the judgment debtor’s 
claim fails in the end or is likely to fail in the end. 
 312.  Chrysler, 512 N.W.2d at 305. 
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be encouraged, since the defendant has little hope of recovering his costs 
from the indigent plaintiff if he defeats the action.”313  However, there is a 
difference between “frivolous” claims and claims that lack merit, in that a 
claim that is ultimately found to be deficient on the merits might have a 
colorable claim to validity.314  In such a situation, the way to determine the 
merits of a case is through litigation.315  There is an important distinction 
between determining the rights and interests of parties through litigation 
according to due process of law and through allowing one party to 
circumvent the system and extinguish the claim of another regardless of the 
merits.  Thus, the more meritorious the claim against a judgment creditor, 
the less just it is to allow a judgment creditor to extinguish it through 
execution. 
The fourth interest of the judgment creditor is present only in situations 
where the judgment debtor fails to contest a writ of execution and a sale 
takes place.316  In such a situation, the judgment creditor has an interest in 
preserving the finality of a writ of execution and subsequent execution 
sale.317  In fact, this can be a powerful argument on the side of a judgment 
 
 313.  O’Connor v. Matzdorff, 458 P.2d 154, 160 (Wash. 1969).  However, the court continued: 
The fear has been expressed that, if the poor are allowed to litigate without paying the 
‘deterring’ court fees, they will inundate the courts with frivolous cases.  This attitude 
overlooks the fact that the poor are most often ignorant of judicial processes, except 
insofar as they are the victims of such processes.  Not only do they not know what 
remedies exist for the wrongs done them and not only are they ignorant of the procedures 
for availing themselves of these remedies, but their attitude toward the courts is one of 
fear. 
Id. at 160–61.  The court was considering whether the trial court should have waived its filing fees 
for an indigent plaintiff, and not whether a writ of execution should issue.  Id. at 155.  However, the 
reasoning in the quoted material is a reminder that it would be incorrect to assume that indigent 
litigants regularly use legal process as a means of seeking a windfall. 
 314.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes b & c (indicating that an argument is 
nonfrivolous if an attorney can find some support for it in minority opinions, law review articles, or 
consultation with other attorneys).  The advisory committee notes also indicate that the rule is not 
meant to dampen an attorney’s creativity or enthusiasm, but to prevent an attorney from making 
claims that are totally without support or in bad faith.  Id.; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 26–29 (2004) (“[W]hat qualifies as a frivolous claim generally depends on the eye of the 
beholder.”). 
 315.  See RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(Lucero, J., concurring); cf. Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. App. 
1992) (noting that a judgment creditor, if allowed to obtain the judgment debtor’s cause of action, 
“can extinguish it entirely without its ever being litigated”). 
 316.  See, e.g., Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).  The Paglia court 
acknowledged this concern, but still found that the trial court had the power to avoid the “inequitable 
result” of one party owning both sides of a lawsuit.  Id. 
 317.  This point is actually somewhat obvious, because the judgment creditor in all of the cases in 
which a sale has already taken place is the party defending against the judgment debtor’s motion to 
set aside the sale.  See, e.g., Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 
1008 (Miss. 2006). 
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creditor.318  However, if the judgment debtor is diligent in taking all 
procedural steps necessary to combat the writ of execution, including 
moving to quash the writ and appealing from the denial of such a motion, 
this concern should be a non-issue.319 
Thus, the judgment creditor has several strong arguments in favor of 
being allowed to execute on choses in action against himself.320  The 
strength of these arguments will, of course, depend on the facts of each case.  
In some cases, the judgment creditor’s interests may outweigh the judgment 
debtor’s, and in others, the courts may reach the opposite conclusion.  In any 
event, the court should have the opportunity to consider the interests of both 
parties before deciding whether a writ of execution should issue. 
3. Society’s Interests 
Society’s interests are fourfold.321  First, society has an interest in 
maintaining the integrity and fairness of its courts.322  Second, and closely 
related, is society’s interest in ensuring that the judgments entered by its 
courts are enforced.323  Third, society has an interest in resolving disputes 
efficiently.324  Finally, society has an interest in ensuring that its courts are 
open to all comers and that justice is equally available to all citizens.325 
The first and second interests of society are closely related  because a 
judgment, or the enforcement thereof, is really just an extension of the 
court’s process.326  Implicit in the role of the courts as arbiters of justice is 
 
 318.  See, e.g., RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076 (“Because Plaintiff did not appeal the district 
court’s decision allowing the execution sale to proceed, we will not consider Plaintiff’s arguments 
attacking the sale’s lawfulness.”). 
 319.  See, e.g., MP Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931, 934 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).  Plaintiff 
judgment debtor filed a motion to controvert wrongful seizure by execution and, when that was 
denied, filed an emergency motion with the court of appeals for “immediate review of the trial 
court’s denial of its motion.”  Id.  This is a prime example of a diligent effort to combat the writ of 
execution, which forced the court to confront the issue head-on and was successful as to that issue.  
Id. at 936.  However, plaintiff ultimately lost on the merits of the appeal.  Id. at 941. 
 320.  See supra notes 279–82 and accompanying text. 
 321.  For the purposes of this Comment, “the interests of society” is used to denote the interests of 
society as a whole and the interests of the court, which is society’s representative in the dispute 
between the parties. 
 322.  See MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936. 
 323.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1074 (noting the high volume of civil litigation in the United 
States). 
 324.  See YEAZELL, supra note 109, at 263. 
 325.  See generally Phillips, supra note 112. 
 326.  See MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936 (holding that a trial court has supervisory power over its own 
process—specifically the procedure for executing on the property of a judgment debtor). 
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the proposition that “courts have certain inherent authority to protect their 
proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional 
responsibilities.”327  Consequently, they are “entitled to take steps necessary 
to enforce [their] decision[s].”328  Executions are meant to “provide fast and 
effective mechanisms” for courts to employ to that end.329  However, a court 
should temper any interest in enforcing a judgment rendered by that court, or 
a sister court, with the court’s interest in preventing its process from 
becoming a tool used by litigants to achieve an unjust result.330  As the Court 
of Appeals of Washington recognized in Paglia and MP Medical, a court has 
a strong interest in supervising its own process to prevent that process from 
becoming an instrument of oppression.331  This is probably why courts have 
reacted so unfavorably to judgment creditors that unabashedly admit that the 
reason they are attempting to execute on a claim against themselves is to 
destroy the judgment debtor’s ability to pursue it.332  That motive suggests 
bad faith and is especially egregious when the judgment debtor has other 
property more valuable than the choses in action that could be used to satisfy 
the judgment.333 
Society and its tribunals also have an interest in efficiency.  With the 
courts becoming notoriously backlogged over the past several decades, this 
interest has taken on greater importance.334  After all, it is society that 
ultimately bears the cost through the expense of financing the courts or 
through the expenditure of the parties’ resources on litigation rather than 
production.335  In some cases it may be extremely efficient to allow a 
judgment creditor to execute upon a judgment debtor’s cause of action 
 
 327.  RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Id. (quoting Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996)). 
 330.  See Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 331.  See MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936; Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514.  It should be noted here that a court 
is also bound to faithfully apply the laws enacted by the legislature in the relevant jurisdiction and 
obey the mandates of courts of higher authority.  MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936 (“We are bound by the 
decisions of our state Supreme Court and err when we fail to follow them.”). 
 332.  Commerce Sav. Ass’n v. Welch, 783 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. App. 1989); MP Med., 213 
P.3d at 933; Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514–15 (Pearson, J., concurring).  See supra notes 140–64 and 
accompanying text for further discussion. 
 333.  See MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936; Paglia, 522 P.2d at 515 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
 334.  See YEAZELL, supra note 109, at 263 (“Over the past two decades, the ‘civil litigation rate’ 
has ranged between .05—one civil lawsuit filed per year per 20 persons—and .058—one suit per 
year for every 17 persons.  In 2004 about 17 million lawsuits were filed.”).  Professor Yeazell also 
noted significant variations in the average time needed to reach trial between jurisdictions.  Id. at 
265–66 (longest median disposition time was 861 days, while the shortest was 217 days). 
 335.  Id. at 291.  Professor Yeazell explains that expenses—such as “the courtroom, the judge, 
clerical staff, and bailiffs—are borne by society generally, paid for by taxes.”  Id.  He noted that in 
the early 1990s litigation cost taxpayers $4000 per day, which would be equivalent to $6400 per day 
in 2008.  Id.  This figure only includes the direct cost to the taxpayers, and does not account for the 
resources expended by the litigants—which, Professor Yeazell notes, are often substantial.  Id. 
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against the judgment creditor.336  Disposing of a case on the merits through a 
trial and subsequent appeal will almost certainly take more time than 
allowing a judgment creditor to obtain and dismiss a lawsuit at the outset of 
the litigation or before an appeal on the merits.  This method is acceptable if 
the judgment debtor’s claims are unlikely to succeed on the merits, but if the 
judgment debtor’s claims are meritorious, society’s interest in efficiency 
must be subordinated to society’s interest in promoting justice.337 
Ultimately, society’s interest in providing a mechanism for the just 
resolution of disputes between all of its members, rich and poor, is its most 
important interest.338  Unfortunately, no bright-line rule, whether allowing 
judgment creditors to execute on choses in action against themselves or 
completely barring that practice, can guarantee a just result in every case.  
Bright-line rules are inadequate because of the complex interests of the 
parties and society described above.339  Thus, the courts must have a 
relatively free hand in deciding whether to allow a writ of execution to issue.  
An ideal rule would allow a court to consider the interests of the judgment 
debtor, the judgment creditor, and society, and then decide whether a writ of 
execution should issue based on the facts of the case before it. 
C. The Solution: A Practical Test for Courts to Determine Whether a Writ 
of Execution Should Issue 
Washington’s discretionary approach leaves the decision of whether to 
allow a judgment creditor to execute on choses in action against itself to the 
discretion of the trial court.340  This is preferable to Utah’s bright-line rule 
allowing the tactic because the facts and circumstances will inevitably vary 
from case to case, and a flexible approach allows a court to attempt to 
accommodate the interests of all parties.341 
If Washington’s approach has any shortcoming, it is that the Paglia and 
MP Medical courts failed to give any real guidance as to the factors a trial 
 
 336.  It saves society, at the very least, the costs of a trial, and reduces the burden on backlogged 
courts.  See id. 
 337.  See Paglia, 522 P.2d at 515 (Pearson, C.J., concurring). 
 338.  RHODE, supra note 314, at 3 (“A commitment to equal justice is central to the legitimacy of 
democratic processes.”). 
 339.  See supra notes 216–28 and accompanying text. 
 340.  MP Med. Inc. v. Redman, 213 P.3d 931, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); Paglia, 522 P.2d at 
514. 
 341.  Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 703 (Utah 2002). 
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court should consider in making its decision.342  The Washington approach 
should be expanded to give further guidance to the trial court as to how to 
proceed when faced with a judgment creditor seeking to execute on a chose 
in action against itself.  Any test should account for the interests of the 
parties and society as described in the preceding sections.  Based on the 
considerations the courts have relied on when deciding whether to allow a 
judgment creditor to execute on a chose in action against himself, the 
following factors should be considered. 
First, courts should consider whether the judgment debtor has other 
assets apart from the chose in action that can be levied and sold at execution 
before reaching the chose in action.343  If the judgment debtor has sufficient 
assets to pay the judgment or obtain a stay, the court should be more inclined 
to allow the writ to issue.344  In such a situation, the fault for failing to pay 
the judgment or post bond lies entirely with the judgment debtor, and the 
balance shifts toward the judgment creditor.345  However, if the judgment 
debtor has either tendered other assets to obtain a stay, or has no other assets 
apart from the choses in action, the court should be less inclined to allow the 
writ to issue against the choses in action.346  In that situation, a judgment 
 
 342.  MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936; Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514.  In Paglia, the court merely stated that a 
trial court should exercise control over its own process if the interest of all the parties could be 
accommodated.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 513.  MP Medical stated only that the court should exercise its 
power over its own process to prevent an unjust result.  MP Med., 213 P.3d at 936.  Both cases left 
unstated the factors the trial court should consider in determining whether the parties’ interests could 
be accommodated or what constitutes an unjust result. 
 343.  This is essentially the reverse of the approach suggested by Judge Zimmerman in his 
concurring opinion in Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 213 (Utah 1999).  
Judge Zimmerman would have prohibited a lawyer from obtaining execution on choses in action for 
legal malpractice claims against himself “unless [those claims are] the only remaining asset[s] of the 
debtor.”  Id.  However, this Comment’s approach would apply to all choses in action.  Moreover, a 
judgment debtor with enough property to satisfy the judgment or post sufficient bond to obtain a stay 
would not be protected.  A judgment debtor with insufficient property to obtain a stay or satisfy the 
judgment would be able to seek protection from the court. 
 344.  See RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(judgment debtor failed to argue inability to pay supersedeas undertaking or satisfy the judgment).  
In some instances, nonmonetary assets, such as real estate, may be accepted as security.  See 
Athridge v. Iglesias, 464 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2006) (accepting real estate as security in 
lieu of a supersedeas undertaking).  And, at least in federal court, “[i]n unusual circumstances . . . the 
district court in its discretion may order partially secured or unsecured stays if they do not unduly 
endanger the judgment creditor’s interest in ultimate recovery.”  Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. 
Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 760–61 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 345.  See RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076. 
 346.  See, e.g., Paglia, 522 P.2d at 512.  In Paglia, the defendant judgment creditor obtained one 
judgment against the judgment debtor plaintiff and attempted to execute on the judgment debtor’s 
choses in action.  Id.  The judgment debtor contested the writ, and the trial judge gave him fifteen 
days to raise the money to pay the judgment, costs, and interest.  Id.  The plaintiff returned to the 
court after obtaining a sufficient loan.  Id.  However, the judgment creditor had purchased another 
judgment against the judgment debtor, and the judgment debtor’s resources were exhausted.  Id.  The 
court of appeals ultimately found that allowing the writ to issue produced an inequitable result.  Id. 
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debtor’s inability to forestall enforcement of the judgment does not arise out 
of any failure to take advantage of procedural options.347  When the 
judgment debtor has taken all measures to forestall execution of the 
judgment and protect her choses in action, the court should be inclined to aid 
her.348 
Second, the courts should consider whether the judgment to be satisfied 
by execution on the chose in action was acquired by the judgment creditor 
through litigation against the judgment debtor, or whether it merely acquired 
it by purchasing the judgment from some third party after the judgment 
debtor filed suit against it.349  This consideration accounts for the 
motivations of the judgment creditor.350  A judgment creditor who has 
obtained a judgment for harm done to him personally has a better 
justification for executing on the judgment debtor’s choses in action than 
one who purchased a third party’s judgment against the judgment debtor to 
avoid litigating the judgment debtor’s claims on the merits.351  Of course, 
this is something of a fiction because in either case the judgment creditor 
will be motivated to execute on the judgment debtor’s cause of action in 
order to avoid further litigation.  However, the active purchase of an 
unsatisfied judgment for the sole purpose of using the execution process to 
avoid being forced to defend a suit in court “borders on abuse of legal 
process” and should not be condoned.352 
Third, the courts should consider whether the judgment debtor is likely 
to succeed on the merits of his claim.353  This factor will help to alleviate 
 
at 514.  Presumably, the plaintiff’s good faith effort to raise the money necessary to pay the 
judgment influenced this decision. 
 347.  See supra note 346. 
 348.  Id. 
 349.  Compare Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 700 (Utah 2002) (judgment 
creditor prevailed in an action to foreclose on a deed of trust against judgment debtor), and Citizens 
Nat’l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Miss. 2006) (bank prevailed on 
counterclaims against judgment debtor), with Paglia, 522 P.2d at 512 (judgment creditor purchased 
claims against judgment debtor from a third party). 
 350.  As distinguished from the first factor, which attempts to account for the motivations and 
actions of the judgment debtor, i.e., whether the judgment debtor has done all he can to forestall 
execution on his choses in action.  See supra note 343 and accompanying text. 
 351.  Indeed, this is the root cause of Chief Judge Pearson’s concerns over the skewed incentives 
that Utah’s rule fosters.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 515 (Pearson, J., concurring); see also Amphibious 
Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2010); RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076–
77. 
 352.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 515 (Pearson, C.J., concurring). 
 353.  At first glance, it may appear that this inquiry violates the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on 
the claims subject to execution.  However, this right could be said to be attached to the claim itself, 
just as Utah holds that the right of access to the state’s courts is attached to the underlying claim.  
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three concerns: (1) that the judgment debtor will not receive fair value for 
his chose in action at the execution sale;354 (2) that the judgment creditor will 
lose the value of the choses in action through the judgment debtor’s 
exhaustion of those rights;355 and (3) that there will be an incentive for 
judgment creditors facing substantial and reasonably certain liability to 
frustrate the judgment debtor’s legitimate claims through execution on 
them.356  As noted earlier, it is highly likely that a judgment creditor will be 
the only bidder at a sale, and he may be able to purchase claims against 
himself at a substantial discount.357  If those claims are likely to be 
successful, he will receive a substantial windfall by avoiding liability and the 
cost of defending against those claims.358  A preliminary consideration of the 
merits of the claim reduces this possibility.  It also hedges against the 
possibility that the judgment debtor will exhaust the claims through 
litigating them, as a judgment debtor that succeeds in his claim will realize 
some value and the judgment creditor will receive an offset in the amount of 
his judgment.359  Finally, consideration of this factor destroys the incentive 
structure that Judge Lucero was so concerned about.360  A judgment creditor 
 
See Applied Med., 44 P.3d at 702–03.  If this right is attached to the claim, rather than the individual, 
the right to a jury trial will not be violated because transfer of the claim to the judgment creditor will 
result in transfer of the right.  See id.  A person has no right to a jury trial for claims he does not 
own.  Thus, the right to a jury trial should present no problem to a judgment creditor in a state that 
holds that a judgment creditor’s purchase of claims against himself does not violate the open courts 
clause because the court is likely to hold that such actions do not violate the right to a jury trial.  A 
court that holds that a judgment creditor’s execution and purchase of claims against itself violates 
the open courts clause will necessarily bar judgment creditors from executing on choses in action 
against themselves, and the issue will be moot. 
  Moreover, a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits is one the courts often 
make in other contexts, such as when considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction.  See 
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary 
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits . . . .”).  Some courts may also 
grant discretionary stays of execution, and one of the common factors they consider is the likelihood 
of success on the merits for the party seeking the stay.  5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 405 
(2007).  The relief the court would grant in this situation would have the same effect as a stay, at 
least as to the choses in action; however, a court’s denial of the motion to quash a writ of execution 
would destroy the plaintiff’s right to have his case heard on the merits, thus raising the concerns 
regarding the right to a jury trial. 
 354.  See supra notes 262–75 and accompanying text. 
 355.  See supra notes 302–04, 308–15 and accompanying text. 
 356.  See supra notes 250–57 and accompanying text. 
 357.  Amphibious Partners LLC v. Redman, 389 F. App’x 762, 767–68 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Marantha Faith Ctr., Inc. v. Colonial Trust Co., 904 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (Miss. 2006). 
 358.  Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 767–68. 
 359.  See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, 512 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 1994); see also 
Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. App. 1992) (“[Judgment 
creditor] admits that he will have a right of offset in the event that [judgment debtor] obtains a 
judgment against him . . . .”). 
 360.  Amphibious Partners, 389 F. App’x at 767–68; RMA Ventures Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. 
Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2009) (Lucero, J., concurring) (noting that allowing defendants 
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faced with strong claims by the judgment debtor has a strong incentive to 
avoid liability by executing on the judgment debtor’s chose in action against 
the judgment creditor.361  However, if courts show a preference for allowing 
strong claims to be heard on the merits, judgment creditors will be much less 
likely to obtain a writ of execution and thus avoid liability.  Consideration of 
this factor mitigates against three of the most compelling concerns that a 
judgment creditor’s execution on claims against himself raises.  Therefore, it 
is probably the most important consideration of the four. 
The fourth and final factor that the courts should consider is whether the 
underlying judgment is currently pending appeal.362  A judgment from which 
no appeal has been taken and the time for filing a notice of appeal has 
expired is conclusive, while one that is currently pending appellate review is 
subject to reversal.363  Of course, in most states a writ of execution may issue 
even while the underlying judgment is pending appellate review, and the 
judgment debtor may be entitled to restitution if he obtains a reversal.364  
However, no such remedy will be available to a judgment debtor who has 
lost his right to pursue the appeal through a writ of execution, and courts 
appear to recognize the injustice of allowing a judgment creditor to 
extinguish the judgment debtor’s right to pursue an appeal in that way.365  
Thus, consideration of this factor will help mitigate this concern. 
Of these four factors, no single one is dispositive.  Rather, they are only 
meant to provide a court with a framework to determine whether the 
issuance of a writ of execution would be appropriate in a given situation.366  
In this way, the application of the test described above will enable courts to 
further the interests of society.367  It promotes a just result by allowing a trial 
 
to execute on claims against themselves incentivizes defendants “to attempt an end run around 
merits determinations”). 
 361.  RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1077. 
 362.  See id. at 1076. 
 363.  See supra notes 287–92 and accompanying text. 
 364.  NEEDHAM & POLLACK, supra note 38, § 11.8; see also Athridge v. Iglesias, 464 F. Supp. 2d 
19, 23 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that “if the [judgment debtors] are successful on appeal, the transfer of 
choses would have been premature and require additional steps to undo what had been done”); id. at 
23–25. 
 365.  RMA Ventures, 576 F.3d at 1076 (recognizing the “degree of discomfort” presented when a 
judgment creditor executes on an appeal to satisfy the same judgment from which the appeal was 
taken); MP Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (“While MP Medical 
has no constitutional right to appeal in this case, allowing one party to destroy the opposing party’s 
appeal by becoming its owner through enforcement of the very judgment under review is 
fundamentally unjust.”). 
 366.  See Paglia v. Breskovich, 522 P.2d 511, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 367.  See supra notes 321–37 and accompanying text. 
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court to apply its knowledge of the facts of each case and to decide on a 
course of action by weighing the interests of both parties.  At the same time, 
it promotes efficiency, as cases that lack merit will be more likely to be 
subject to execution, sale to a judgment creditor, and dismissal.  Finally, it 
promotes a proper incentive structure in which judgment creditors are not 
allowed to escape meritorious claims by taking advantage of the fact that the 
judgment debtor cannot afford to pay a judgment. 
V. THE PROPOSED BALANCING TEST IN APPLICATION AND             
POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION 
A. A Return to the Scenario Described in Part I 
To illustrate the potential consequences of a bright-line rule and the 
application of the test proposed in the preceding Part, it may be helpful to 
return to the hypothetical situation discussed in the Introduction to this 
Comment, with a few additional facts.368  To review, plaintiff is injured in a 
car accident in which a delivery truck driver negligently collides with the 
plaintiff while making deliveries for his employer.369  Plaintiff has 
convincing evidence of the driver’s negligence.  However, the plaintiff is 
liable for an outstanding judgment for a breach of contract claim in the 
amount of $50,000 and has no other significant assets.370  The plaintiff sues 
both the truck driver and his employer, a shipping company, for $500,000 
for personal injuries.  The employer purchases the judgment from the 
original judgment creditor for $10,000, executes on the plaintiff’s claims 
against both the employer and the driver, then purchases those claims for 
$10,000 total.371  The claims are extinguished when the judgment creditor 
substitutes itself as plaintiff and dismisses them both.  The judgment creditor 
 
 368.  See supra Part I. 
 369.  This would give rise to an unliquidated tort claim for damages for pain and suffering, 
medical expenses, lost wages, and so forth.  This hypothetical is intended to be a variation on the one 
proposed by Chief Judge Pearson in his concurring opinion in Paglia.  522 P.2d at 515. 
 370.  This is essentially the same situation the judgment debtor found himself in in Paglia, except 
that the judgment debtor in that case had three outstanding judgments against him totaling $20,000.  
Id. at 512. 
 371.  Defendant’s purchase of two claims, instead of one, is meant to highlight the fact that 
codefendants conceivably could cooperate to extinguish multiple claims of the judgment debtor.  Cf. 
FM. Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 2d 795, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that 
the judgment creditor explicitly excluded the judgment debtor’s claims against its codefendant).  
However, this may require a fairly high level of trust between codefendant A and codefendant B 
because once the claims against codefendant A are purchased by codefendant B, codefendant B 
could simply turn on codefendant A and assert the plaintiff’s claim. 
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has eliminated a $500,000 claim for a mere $20,000,372 and it still has the 
right to collect the $40,000 remaining on the judgment.373 
Suppose further that shortly after the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed, the 
unfortunate plaintiff undergoes surgery for his injuries and the doctor 
negligently injures him while on the operating table.374  The plaintiff’s 
injuries are aggravated, and he sues the doctor for malpractice, alleging 
damages of $150,000.  The doctor, having heard the plaintiff’s story during a 
consultation before the surgery, contacts the shipping company and offers to 
purchase the judgment for $10,000.375  The shipping company, seeing an 
opportunity to recoup part of its expenditures in the previous litigation, 
obliges, and the doctor obtains the right to collect the $40,000 deficiency 
judgment.  The doctor then repeats the process, executing on the plaintiff’s 
malpractice claim, purchasing it for $10,000, substituting herself as plaintiff, 
and dismissing the claim.  Not only has the plaintiff now lost both of his 
negligence claims and his malpractice claim, but he is still liable for a 
$30,000 deficiency judgment.  Thus, the process could be repeated any time 
the plaintiff brings an action in court until the judgment is satisfied.  In other 
words, in a state that adopts a bright-line rule allowing a judgment creditor 
to execute on choses in action against itself, a plaintiff may essentially be 
barred by his judgment creditors from court until the judgment is satisfied or 
he declares bankruptcy.376 
In a state like Utah that allows judgment creditors to execute on causes 
of action against themselves, a case like this could occur.  Granted, this is an 
extreme example, which no courts have encountered.  However, if it ever 
arises, under current Utah law a trial court could do nothing to prevent 
events from unfolding as in the hypothetical situation described above.377  
The purpose of execution is to allow a court to aid a judgment creditor in 
collecting his judgment, not to provide a procedural tool for a judgment 
creditor to render himself immune from suit.378  Use of the procedural tool of 
execution as a shield against liability is a perversion of the purpose behind 
the law of execution because it grants the judgment creditor a right beyond 
 
 372.  This equals the cost of purchasing the judgment plus the cost of purchasing the claims. 
 373.  See Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1999). 
 374.  Apparently, this two-step process has never occurred.  However, it is entirely conceivable 
that such a situation could arise. 
 375.  See Paglia, 522 P.2d at 512. 
 376.  See Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 213 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 377.  It would be bound by the higher court’s decisions. 
 378.  Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996). 
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the mere right to recover the value of the judgment and “outrage[s] the right 
of a judgment debtor.”379  Therefore it is undesirable. 
In a state that applies Washington’s rule along with the test proposed by 
this Comment, a court would have the power to prevent such a result.380  
Applying the factors, the court would have found that the plaintiff did not 
have other assets with which to satisfy the judgment apart from the chose in 
action,381 which would favor allowing the writ to issue.382  However, the 
court would also have found that the judgment creditor purchased the 
judgment from a third party, evidencing an intent to execute on the judgment 
not to satisfy it,383 but to obtain and extinguish the plaintiff’s claims.  Upon 
further examination of the facts of the plaintiff’s case, the court would find 
that the plaintiff has presented a strong claim for damages against the 
delivery driver and his employer and is likely to succeed on the merits.384  
Thus, the plaintiff would probably be entitled to recover damages, and the 
defendant who holds the judgment would be entitled to an offset of $50,000 
if the plaintiff’s claim succeeds.  All of these factors would cut against 
allowing the writ of execution to issue.  Finally, the court would consider 
whether the judgment in the original breach of contract case was pending 
appeal.385  It is not, so this factor would cut in favor of allowing the writ to 
issue. 
On balance, if the test is properly applied, the defendant’s purpose in 
purchasing the claims—to obtain both sides of the lawsuit and extinguish the 
claims to avoid liability—coupled with the fact that the plaintiff is likely to 
succeed on the merits, would be of significant weight.  They would be 
weighed against the fact that the claim may be exhausted of all value if the 
plaintiff’s claim ultimately fails in addition to the fact that the judgment on 
which execution would be based was entirely conclusive.  However, in this 
situation, because the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits and 
defendant would be entitled to an offset, the danger that the value of 
plaintiff’s claim will be exhausted is reduced.386  Further, the conclusiveness 
of the judgment in this situation does not outweigh the injustice of 
forbidding a plaintiff from litigating meritorious claims.  Accordingly, the 
 
 379.  Paglia, 522 P.2d at 514 (quoting Triplett v. Bergman, 642 P. 899, 900 (Wash. 1914)). 
 380.  Again, Washington courts have the inherent power to ensure that their own process is not 
used to procure an inequitable result.  Id. 
 381.  See supra notes 342–65 and accompanying text. 
 382.  See supra notes 342–44 and accompanying text.  After all, the plaintiff has no assets, and the 
judgment creditor’s recovery would be at risk if the plaintiff were allowed to proceed because the 
plaintiff could possibly exhaust the claim.  See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, 512 N.W.2d 
303, 305 (Iowa 1994). 
 383.  See supra notes 347–50 and accompanying text. 
 384.  See supra notes 351–60 and accompanying text. 
 385.  See supra notes 361–63 and accompanying text. 
 386.  Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. App. 1992). 
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court would deny the writ of execution and the plaintiff would be allowed to 
pursue his cause of action.387 
This approach has many benefits.  In a situation such as the one 
described above, it allows the court to protect the interests of the judgment 
debtor and the judgment creditor alike.388  The judgment debtor is allowed to 
pursue his claims, and if the claims are successful, the judgment creditor will 
have the amount of his liability for the plaintiff’s injuries reduced by the 
amount of the outstanding judgment.389  Moreover, no party has been denied 
access to the courts.390  In sum, the application of this test provides a result 
that is “just in both appearance and fact,” and allows the courts to fulfill their 
duty to provide fair and equal treatment in the resolution of disputes.391 
B. Potential Barriers to Implementation 
While the Washington approach coupled with the four factors above is 
preferable to an approach that allows judgment creditors to execute on 
choses in action against themselves regardless of the circumstances, there 
may be some barriers to implementing this plan that are beyond the control 
of the courts.  In particular, a barrier could arise in the language of state 
execution statutes and the manner in which that state’s courts have 
interpreted it.392  The authorities suggest that the balancing test proposed by 
 
 387.  The doctor’s attempt to execute on the plaintiff’s claims would be subjected to a similar 
analysis if she is able to obtain a judgment over the plaintiff.  However, if the plaintiff does prevail 
and the judgment is paid through an offset for the shipping company, there will be no deficiency 
judgment for the doctor to obtain. 
 388.  This was a key requirement laid down in Paglia v. Breskovich that is easy to overlook in the 
text of the opinion.  522 P.2d 511, 513–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 389.  Of course, if the judgment debtor’s claim fails, the judgment creditor has no property against 
which to execute.  Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rosenberger, 512 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 1994).  
However, in the case of a judgment debtor with no assets apart from the choses in action, he recovers 
as much as he would have had the plaintiff never brought suit: nothing.  There may be substantial 
cost incurred by defending the case though.  See id.  Moreover, the judgment creditor could use the 
threat of an attempt to execute as a bargaining tool in settlement negotiations.  This is the reason that 
the likelihood of success on the merits is such an important consideration. 
 390.  Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 391.  Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1999). 
 392.  See Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 1010 (Miss. 
2006) (“[T]he clerks of all courts of law or equity . . . shall, at the request and cost of the owner of 
the judgment or decree or his attorney, issue executions on all judgments and decrees rendered 
therein . . . .” (quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-111 (2011))); Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 210–11 (“We . . . 
hold that our writ of execution rules are quite broad and, absent legislative proscription, encompass 
unliquidated tort claims, including legal negligence actions.” (emphasis added)). 
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this Comment is equitable in nature.393  When a statute controls an issue 
before a court, equity must give way, and the court is bound to faithfully 
apply the controlling statute.394  A state with a statutory regime that divests 
the courts of all control over whether a writ of execution should issue 
presents a significant barrier to judicial adoption of such a test.  In states 
with such statutes, legislation should be enacted to give courts discretion 
over whether to allow a judgment creditor to execute on choses in action 
against itself.  No vast statutory overhaul is necessary.  A simple statute that 
codifies the test above and vests power with the courts to deny a writ of 
execution to a judgment creditor on choses in action against itself should be 
sufficient. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
States that allow execution on choses in action will have to decide 
whether to allow judgment creditors to extinguish a claim against 
themselves through a writ of execution.  Of course, the judgment creditor 
has a right to apply the judgment debtor’s property in order to satisfy a 
judgment entered according to due process of law.  However, a bright-line 
rule allowing a judgment creditor to execute on choses in action against 
himself ignores the legitimate interests of the judgment debtor.  Conversely, 
a bright-line rule prohibiting a judgment creditor from executing on choses 
in action against itself ignores the legitimate interests of the judgment 
creditor.  Thus, a bright-line rule, whether allowing or prohibiting the tactic, 
can never properly balance these competing interests. 
Consequently, Washington’s discretionary approach is preferable 
because it allows a court to exercise control over its own process to prevent 
the inequitable result of a judgment creditor obtaining control of both sides 
of a lawsuit if the interests of all concerned parties can be accommodated.  
However, courts need a structured approach to decide whether a writ of 
execution should issue that effectively balances those interests.  Therefore, 
courts should consider (1) whether the judgment debtor has other assets 
apart from the chose in action that can be levied and sold at execution; (2) 
 
 393.  See Heritage Corp. of S. Fla. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 01-003519-
CIV, 2008 WL 4858244, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2008); Donan v. Dolce Vita Sa, Inc., 992 So. 2d 
859, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Brenton Bros. v. Dorr, 239 N.W. 808, 810 (Iowa 1931); MP 
Med. Inc. v. Wegman, 213 P.3d 931, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); Paglia, 522 P.2d at 512–13. 
 394.  First Bank v. H.R. Buckman, C.L.U. & Assocs., Inc., No. 83-444, 1983 WL 162396, at *1 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam) (“The general rule is that equity follows the statutes and the 
circuit court is bound to apply the provisions of a statute which controls the issue before it.”); 
McPadden v. Morris, 13 A.2d 679, 680 (Conn. 1940) (“[A] court is powerless to add to the wording 
of a statute which is clear and direct.  It cannot seek out what it may conceive to be the equities of 
each particular case and ignore specific provisions of a law which clearly controls them.”).  
However, whether a court’s equitable powers to manage its own process and prevent injustice are 
limited by a state’s broad execution statute is a matter of statutory interpretation. 
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whether the judgment creditor acquired the judgment to be satisfied through 
litigation against the judgment debtor or from a third party; (3) whether the 
judgment debtor is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim; and (4) 
whether the judgment to be satisfied is currently pending appeal. 
In sum, execution is meant to be a tool to aid judgment creditors in 
obtaining satisfaction of their judgments, and nothing more.  Jurisdictions 
that allow judgment creditors to execute on choses in action against 
themselves enable those judgment creditors to use the execution statute to 
gain far more than mere satisfaction of their judgment.  Judgment creditors 
in those states gain, in essence, the right to avoid being brought into court to 
defend against the judgment debtor’s claim.  Conversely, the judgment 
debtor loses his right to redress for injury at the hands of the judgment 
creditor.  Such a policy is inconsistent with the goals of execution and is 
therefore undesirable.  The approach proposed by this Comment protects 
against this sort of abuse and gives courts the power to ensure that disputes 
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